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India's Defense Strategy: Lessons from and for China

Sunil Sondhi*

Abstract

The transgressions and clashes at the demarcated border of almost 3,500 kms between India and China have to be seen in the context of the political and military strategies of the two countries in which elements of conflict and cooperation continue to coexist. It seems a part of Chinese strategy to let disputes simmer while it waits for opportune time nationally and globally to strike. Chinese operational tactics is to lure the enemy at its vulnerable points and use PLA's armed mobs to ambush them in the short and swift assaults, without declaring war.

On the other hand, India has consistently adopted the strategy of building a strong military befitting the status of a great power. In the current geopolitical context, India has the potential to contribute significantly to a balance of power that maintains international peace and security, and is also helpful in its own rise to the status of a great power. However, as before, China's economic and military strength is still a challenge for India.

This article looks into the evolution of defense strategies of India and China since their respective independence in 1947 and 1949, to get a perspective on the overarching framework in which the two countries pursue their national interests. Specifically the article traces the course of development and implementation of India's defense strategy in the context of its relations with China.

Keywords: Defense, Security, Strategy, Military, Diplomacy, Weapons

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Introduction

Relations between India and China have deteriorated sharply since 15th June 2020, when the two armies clashed in hand-to-hand combat in Galwan Valley in Eastern Ladakh, reminding one of “Fourth World War” imagined by Albert Einstein. Twenty Indian army personnel, including a colonel, and unspecified number of Chinese army personnel including a colonel on their side, were killed in the confrontation in which no firearms were used. In terms of casualties, this clash was the most serious since the clash in Nathu La in 1967, in which around 80 Indian army personnel and over 300 Chinese army personnel were killed in artillery, and gunfire between the two armies.

Along with the primitive nature of the combat, it is surprising that in this age of information technology and artificial intelligence, the border between India and China is still not clearly defined or demarcated along its 3,500-km length across the Himalayas which constitute a sort of a natural buffer between the two countries. It also remains a mystery how the officers and personnel of the two armies communicate at the border between the two countries when they don’t have mutually approved maps of the area, and when they cannot speak or understand each other’s language.

There is more to this issue than what meets the eye. The transgressions and clashes at the border have to be seen in the context of the political and military strategies of the two countries in which elements of conflict and cooperation continue to coexist. It seems a part of Chinese strategy to let disputes simmer while it waits for opportune time nationally and globally to strike. Chinese operational tactics is to lure the enemy at its vulnerable points and use PLA’s armed mobs to ambush them in short and swift assaults, without declaring war.

This article looks into the evolution of defense strategies of India and China since their respective independence in 1947 and 1949, to get a perspective on the overarching framework in which the two countries pursue their national interests. Specifically this

article traces the course of development and implementation of India's defense strategy in the context of its relations with China.

Battling Colonial Legacy

The border between India and China had not been and is still not demarcated from point to point throughout its length of almost 3,500 kms from Ladakh in the West to Arunachal Pradesh in the East. Even the LAC agreed to after the 1962 Sino-Indian war is not precisely delineated. In the mountain ranges, several imaginary lines and borders separating the two countries exist which were drawn on maps made by different agencies of Britain, India, and China between 1865 and 1962. Starting from Johnson line in 1865, through the British office Line; MacDonald Line; MacMohan Line: India's Claim Line; and China's Claim line. The perceptual and often one-sided definitions of the international border led to Line of Actual Control after the Sino-India war in 1962.

After independence, India assumed that it had inherited the boundaries of the country from the British. China was reluctant to give legitimacy to anything done by the previous regimes in the country. Theirs was a political and practical approach, in which they seemed to accept the accomplished facts of history as *de facto* controls and not *de jure* claims. Using this approach, they hastened to extend control over what were not accomplished facts of history (Giri, 1999, p.503). Moving fast, they started building Sinkiang-Tibet road in 1951, and completed the 220 Km road in 1957. India did not hear or see anything till the road had been completed and shown in Chinese maps in 1958. Even then, India tried to play down the issue and did not lodge any diplomatic protest (Giri, 1999, p.503).

Speaking at length on India China relations, in Rajya Sabha on 10th September 1959, the Prime Minister made a statement which had significant bearing on the subsequent course of mutual relations of the two countries, and the development of India's defense strategy ; "... we have always looked upon the Ladakh area as a different area as, if I may say so, some vaguer area so far as the frontier is concerned because the exact line of the frontier is not

at all clear as in the case of the MacMahon Line. When we discovered in 1958, more than a year, ago, that a road had been built across Yehchong in the north-east corner of Ladakh, we were worried. We did not know where it was. Hon. Members asked, why did you not know before? It is a relevant question but the fact of the matter is that we just are not within hundred miles of that area. It is an uninhabitable area and it has not been under any kind of administration. Nobody has been present there. It is a territory where not even a blade of grass grows, about 17,000 feet high. It adjoins Sinkiang. We sent a party, practically of explorers, small group of six or seven or eight or ten, mountaineers and others, to find out about this. One of the groups of this party was apprehended by the Chinese Government and there was correspondence on this”.

Following this statement on 10th September, a note was sent on 13th September 1959 to Defense Secretary, Home Secretary and External Affairs Secretary to the effect that “the Aksai Chin area has to be left more or less as it is. We have no check-post there and practically little means of access. Any questions relating to it can only be considered, when the time arises, in the context of the larger question of the entire border. For the present, we have to put up with the Chinese occupation of this North-East sector and their road across the area” (HBR, 2014, p.7).

The Prime Minister’s statement and the subsequent directions had been given after the Chinese had overrun the Indian post at Longju in NEFA on 26th August 1959, claiming that it was in the Chinese territory. At a time when China had already shown signs of adventurism and had made incursions into Indian territory NEFA, it was a clear sign of vacillation and self-doubt in India’s defense strategy when the Prime Minister admitted ignorance of the extent of Indian territory in Ladakh and played down the evidence of China’s infrastructure building activities in the region.

A month later, on 21st October 1959, the Chinese army ambushed an Indian patrol in Ladakh, in Kongka La, close to the Hot springs and Galwan Valley. These two incidents, with the Prime Minister’s

articulation of India's defense strategy in between, heralded that the might of China had arrived in Ladakh and Tibet. China had made clear that they meant to hold on to their claims, by force if necessary. These incursions also transformed the then dormant borders in Ladakh and Tibet into a live one (HBR, 2014, p.3.) By the end of the next year, China had forcibly annexed a part of the Depsang Plains opposite Daulat Beg Oldie in northern Ladakh, and a total of 7,000 sq. miles of unoccupied territory in this sector. In 1961, China forcibly annexed the pastures between the passes of Lanak La and Dumjor La. China was now seeking and annexing unoccupied territory, which would give it a strategic advantage not only in terms of war, but also for demonstration of strength to condition India into a gradual submission (Khatri, 2017, p. 76).

As the dispute became deeper and the relations between the two countries worsened, a 'Forward Policy' was initiated at the highest levels of decision making in India. In a meeting at Prime Minister's office on 2nd November 1961, it was decided that:

1. "So far as Ladakh is concerned, we are to patrol as far forward as possible from our present positions towards the International border as recognized by us. This will be done with a view to establishing our posts which would prevent the Chinese from advancing further and also domination from any posts which they may have already established in our territory. This must be done without getting involved in a clash with the Chinese, unless this becomes necessary in self-defence.
2. As regards UP and other Northern areas, there are not the same difficulties as there are in Ladakh. We should, therefore, as far as practicable, go forward and be in effective occupation of the whole frontier. Where there are any gaps, they must be covered by patrolling or by posts.
3. In view of the numerous operational and administrative difficulties, efforts should be made to position major concentration of forces along our borders in places

conveniently situated behind the forward posts from where they could be maintained logistically and from where they can restore a border situation at short notice.” (HBR, 2014, p.8).

Following these orders, patrolling in the Galwan Valley region by Indian forces was initiated, and a post was established 5th July, 1962 which was subsequently brought upto approximately a platoon strength. Within a week, however, this post was surrounded by some 70 Chinese, and gradually they increased their strength to a battalion. While the Western Command recommended air maintenance of the besieged post, the same was turned down by Army Headquarter which directed that maintenance was to be carried by land route only. Land columns were sent between 15-18 July 1962, but they were intercepted and prevented by the Chinese from reaching the post. The siege of Galwan post ended only on the morning of 20th October 1962, when China launched a coordinated attack all along the border and this post was overrun in a matter of hours (HBR, 2014, p. 12).

Losing Touch with Reality

Independent India's first attempt to integrate strategic defense with operational and tactical offense had failed miserably. As India's defense policy and preparation lay shattered, Prime Minister Nehru was compelled to admit that, "We were getting out of touch with reality in the modern world and we were living in an artificial atmosphere of our creation. We have been shocked out of it, all of us, whether it is the government or the people; some have felt it less, some more" (Gopal, 1980, pp. 222-3). The defeat led to an intriguing question in India's defense strategy: how did China manage to occupy and annex vast Indian territory despite Nehru being at the peak of his leadership role in the global stage?

An internal inquiry into the debacle was ordered by the new Chief of Army, Gen. Chowdhary. The inquiry was conducted by Maj. Gen. Henderson Brooks and Brigadier PS Bhagat. The Henderson Brooks Report brought out the political and military naivete,

muddled thinking, contradictions and infighting that prevailed in decision-making structure and the failure of planning and command (Verghese, p. 7). Indian leadership's unwillingness to face the reality of its systemic weakness is also evident from the fact that the Henderson Brooks Report officially still remains top-secret classified document yet to be discussed in the Parliament. The substance of the report was available to London *Times* correspondent Neville Maxwell who used the extracts from the Report in his book *India's China War*. Extracts from the Report are now available online.

From the report we learn that in a crucial meeting with the Defense Minister on 22nd September 1962, the Chief of Army Staff had cautioned that any action by India in NEFA may result in the Chinese retaliating in the Galwan Valley region. However, the Foreign Secretary was of the opinion that the operation for the eviction of the Chinese from NEFA should be undertaken, even at the expense of loss of some territory in Ladakh (HBR, 2014, p.17). The army was accordingly directed to "throw the Chinese out" from the NEFA region, and "fight it out" in the Ladakh region.

The making of this decision, and all the information, analysis, departments, ministries, and persons who contributed to the making of this decision is itself an area for essential research. From Prime Minister to the Corps Command, through the Defense Ministry, Intelligence Bureau, Army Headquarters, and the Foreign Ministry, a whole system of decision making seems to have been bypassed to give irrational orders which were militarily untenable. "The orders to "fight it out" to those far flung, tactically unsound and uncoordinated small posts brings out vividly how unrealistic these orders were. It is orders such as these that were issued, time and again, that bring out to one's mind whether the General Staff Branch Army Headquarters were in touch with the realities of the situation. It appears that events controlled actions rather than actions events" (HBR, 2014, p. 19).

A shocking aspect of decision making at the highest levels during the conflict, revealed by the Henderson Brooks Report is that of

formation of 4th Corps of Army shortly before the Chinese aggression on 20th October 1962. The 33rd Corps of the Army was responsible for defense of NEFA till 3rd October. It had made perhaps the only military planning in this conflict, acting as a bulwark and refusing to be hustled into a gamble that was so obviously militarily unsound, and for its pains it was replaced by the 4th Corps” (HBR, 2014, p. 81). All of a sudden, the plan and the preparations recommended by the 33rd Corps were sidelined. On 4th October, just two weeks before the start of war, it was replaced by 4th Corps with Lt. Gen. BM Kaul as Corps Commander. Till a day before, the 4th Corps had not been constituted, and the organization had not been formed. Yet it was raised the next day and it was supposed to form, function, conduct operations and aggressively defend the NEFA border against the Chinese army mobilized and waiting there for almost a year.

Brigadier JP Dalvi. who was at the forefront at Namka Chu river with his 7th Infantry Brigade when the Chinese attacked and was taken as prisoner of war to be released only seven months later, wrote in his book, in the chapter entitled “The End of Make Believe”, that Prime Minister Nehru had himself told the Army Chief that “he had good reasons to believe that Chinese would not take any strong actions against us” (Dalvi, 1979, p. 245). It is thus evident that the decision was taken at the highest level against the military recommendation from the ground, and there was no overall plan to respond to a major Chinese counterattack across the border. The very basis of knee jerk formation and deployment of 4th Corps in NEFA rested on wishful thinking of the higher leadership that there will be no retaliation from the Chinese and the government will be able to claim success in defending the borders against Chinese incursions. President Radhakrishnan minced no words when he held the Government responsible for its “credulity and negligence” (Verghese, p.6). There is little doubt that “for the Government of India it turned out to be the Himalayan Blunder at all levels, a failure of the higher direction of war” (Dalvi, 1979, p. 15).

One aspect of the higher direction of war that has not received sufficient attention in study and research on India's China policy so far is the role of Indian diplomacy. Security and defense are not the concerns of military only. In fact, war has long been considered as diplomacy by another means. India's China policy during the Nehru years must be seen as having failed. But before it failed on the borders, it had already failed at the negotiating table. We are yet to probe deeply into the shortcomings of Indian diplomacy in our relations with China. At least on two occasions India's policy was short sighted. First was when we could have negotiated a realistic deal when Nehru acquiesced with the Chinese resuming their suzerainty and jurisdiction over Tibet. Second occasion was when we did not take firm stand against the Chinese early enough when we came to know of their territorial ambitions and transgressions (Dixit, 1998, p. 354).

During his tenure, Nehru was the External Minister also and he was frequently characterized in the Western diplomatic correspondence as lacking "practical realism", and as being "volatile and quick tempered," "effeminate," and "racially resentful" (Graham, & Davis, 2020, p.199). Each of Nehru's three visits to US were seen as "profound disappointment" with lasting impact on Indo-US relations. As a leader, he was regarded as riddled with "uncertainties rather than decisiveness," "wooly and evasive", and singularly unfit to steer India on the right course in the geopolitical context at that time (Graham & Davis, 2020, pp. 210-11). Eisenhower believed that Nehru had a vacillating leadership style, and was swayed more by personality than by logical argument (Graham & Davis, 2020, pp. 219-20). Lester Pearson, Canadian Prime Minister and Nobel laureate branded Nehru as a naïve idealist and hypocrite (Graham & Davis, 2020, p.218). Such views served to confirm the views expressed by Dr. Radhakrishnan, and by the Henderson Brooks Report.

Lessons Learnt and Taught

India's humiliating defeat and loss of vast territory in the war with China made it imperative to review the defense strategy and

operational policies. While the Henderson Brook Report remained classified, its recommendations generally formed the basis of reforms undertaken in the following years. Reorganisation and restructuring of the Army was the first priority. Force deployment patterns were changed on the basis of the lessons learnt from the war. While some sections of the Army were converted into mountain divisions, the Indo Tibetan Border Police which had already been raised with four battalions during the war, was further expanded in strength and role. Subsequently, the entire stretch of India China border was assigned to ITBP for border guarding duty. Along side, another paramilitary force, the Border Security Force was created to manage the first line of defense and ensure continuous monitoring of the defense situation from border observation posts along the borders.

Modernization of the weapons systems of the armed forces was an immediate necessity, considering that Indian soldiers fought the 1962 war with World War II vintage 303 Enfield rifle, while the Chinese were already producing and using Type-56 assault rifles since 1956. It was a copy of Soviet AK-47 rifle, and was being made in millions in state factory and even exported globally for subversion and guerilla warfare. This small arm was a significant factor in China's dispatch of waves of armed mobs across the borders during the war with India. India's indigenous assault rifle INSAS entered production only in 1994, and this too was a copy of AK-47. As indigenous production was a far cry, India took recourse to procurement from foreign suppliers, the major acquisitions of military equipment from foreign countries included the MIG aircraft and T Series tanks from Soviet Union, which subsequently came to be manufactured in India and still constitute the backbone of Indian Army and Air Force.

India's negligence in overlooking the importance and urgency of establishing administrative control over far flung areas in Aksai Chin was an opportunity that China did not miss. China's completion of a road across Aksai Chin in 1957 was a trigger for India China conflict in the 1950's. After the war, India's Border Roads Organisation, which had been created in 1960, was

integrated with Military Engineering Service to build network of roads adjacent to India's frontiers to ensure easy and quick access to forward areas all along the border. The completion of 220 km DBO-Shyok road by the BRO along the LAC in Ladakh in April 2019, is one of the reasons for Chinese troops to revisit Galwan valley after sixty years and try again to sneak into Indian territory and occupy a vantage point overlooking the DBO-Shyok road. Earlier tactics of intrusion, occupation, consolidation, with heavy reinforcement for support in the event of a provoked clash, backfired this time as the Indian forces got immediate reinforcement and responded aggressively.

China's comments with regard to current border incidents, that India should remember lessons of 1962, should remind them of some lessons India has taught them since then. In September 1967, a series of minor construction activities near the mountain pass at Nathu La led to another clash between Indian and Chinese soldiers. As Chinese soldiers opened fire from their bunkers, heavier fire from Indian artillery tactically better located at high ground destroyed most of Chinese bunkers and caused heavy casualties on the Chinese side (Rowand, 2020). For next twenty years Sino-Indian border remained peaceful, till it erupted again in 1986 and met with even stronger Indian response. Faced with Chinese intrusion in Sumdorong Chu region, the then Indian Army Chief General Sundarji launched Operation Falcon and used Russian MI-26 helicopters to airlift and land a brigade to take up positions on Hathung La ridge overlooking Sumdorong Chu. As the standoff continued, Sundarji further strengthened Indian forces all across the Himalayan border. Aggressive posture and standoff for almost nine months yielded results and bilateral negotiations resolved the dispute (Joshi, 2017).

Evolving Defense Strategy

The 1962 war between India and China was more than a border war. It was not a misadventure on the part of either of them. Instead, it was a clash of ambitious strategies of two newly independent states aspiring to play a big role in regional and

international politics. Jawahar Lal Nehru, the maker of India's foreign policy during the early years, had written even before independence that India and China were capable of joining America, Soviet Union and Britain as great powers, and India's potential resources were probably greater than China's (Sondhi, 1994, p. 44). He also saw convergence of interests among the Asian nations, particularly India and China, and he wanted that "the affairs of Asia be handled by a China-India axis (Sondhi, 1994, p.51). This strategy of keeping the super powers out of Asia and building a China-India axis as another pole in the balance of power in international politics confirmed that India was a balance of power actor steeped in Anglo-American tradition (Kapur, 1971, p.75).

In keeping with the objective of achieving rightful place for India in the community of nations and the potential capability to play a constructive role in promoting peace and development in Asia and the world, India pursued a policy of building its industrial and technological strength to serve the cause of peace and development. The policies for building heavy industry, nuclear and space research, and conventional arms were initiated in the early decades and were meant to achieve rapid industrialization of the country, which was good from the economic point of view as well as for defense. However, India did not seem to have a clear connection between its long term strategy and operational tactics to defend itself before it was strong enough (Sondhi, 1994, p. 47).

On the other hand, Mao-Tse tung did not quite share Nehru's vision of Sino-Indian cooperation and friendship leading to an era of peace and development in the Asian region. The Chinese leadership was more pragmatic and focused sharply on its territorial integration and strategic interests. Barely two years after Chinese independence, it initiated work on border roads linking far flung areas of Tibet and Sinkiang. The Chinese leadership believed, and still believes, that their destiny is to be the most important Asian power and to become one of the greatest powers of the world" (Dixit, 1998, p. 353).

To achieve its objective, China adopted a pragmatic and dynamic policy of aligning with the super powers in the cold war period. During the first two decades of its independence, it relied completely on Soviet capital and technology for industrial and military development. Soviet assistance ranged from scientific and technical education to project design, and product engineering to the creation of modern industrial and military organization. After the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969 over Zhenbao island in Ussuri river, in which China used the strategy of “Man over Weapons” to overwhelm Soviet military, China emerged as an aspiring power in its own right. In the heyday of non-alignment, in 1972, China entered into economic and technical cooperation with the United States to modernize its industrial capabilities through selective engagement with market economy.

While China achieved nuclear capability in 1964, India conducted peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 and declared nuclear capability in 1998. Both countries have a declared nuclear strategy of “No first Use”, and “Credible Minimum Deterrence”. India has been a strong advocate of complete and universal disarmament and has played a key role in UN initiatives for nuclear disarmament. India has not been engaged in arms race with any country, even when Pakistan has reportedly more warheads. While India keeps its nuclear capability at the minimum level required for effective deterrence, its current nuclear doctrine allows the advantage of adapting interpretation of effective deterrence to counter any threat to its security and defend itself in whatever manner it deems fit (Vij, 2017 p.13). China, too, has made “no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve(s) the option of taking all measures” (PRC, 2019, p.5).

India has consistently adopted the strategy of building a strong military befitting the status of a great power. Drawing lessons from its wars with China and Pakistan, India has continuously upgraded its military equipment and organization. As Prime Minister, Modi stressed in his address to the armed forces in Ladakh on 3rd July 2020, a strong military in India is not only an assurance of security of the country but it is also a strong force for

world peace. Towards this end, effective steps have been taken to build strategic relationships with the US, Russia, France, and Israel, to procure most modern weapons for the Indian armed forces to build strong defense capabilities for the country and the region.

A quick look at the global geopolitical context shows that in recent years international strategic competition is on the rise. Russia's military doctrine of 2014 gives an impression of going back to the great power doctrines of the past. "In the manner of Monroe doctrine, it sends Western powers the message that Russia's neighborhood should be regarded as its sphere of influence, which Moscow is ready to defend, if necessary by all means". (Sinovets & Renz, 2015, p.11). Taking note, the US National Defense Strategy of 2018 declared that "Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in US national security. China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbours while militarizing features in the South China Sea. Russia has violated the borders of nearby nations and pursues veto power over the economic, diplomatic, and security decisions of its neighbours" (US, 2018, p.1). China as the new entrant in this strategic competition sees in its Defense Paper 2019 opportunities, "as the realignment of international power accelerates and the strength of the emerging markets and developing countries keeps growing, the configuration of strategic power is becoming more balanced" (PRC, 2019, p.1).

India would have loved to play this game at the high table, but so far, its lack of sufficient economic and military power has kept it on the sidelines of great power games.

Nevertheless, in the current geopolitical context India has the potential to contribute significantly to a balance of power that maintains international peace and security, and is also helpful in its own rise to the status of a great power. This is something like what Nehru tried to do in the 1950s and tripped over the Chinese hurdle. As before, China's economic and military strength is still a challenge for India. However, India has learnt the lesson well and

can now teach China a lesson or two even with current resource disparities and capability gaps.

Sharpened integration of operational and tactical offense with the defense strategy, selective investment push in weapon's acquisition and organizational modernization, closer security partnerships with the US and Russia, and above all unflinching determination and political will, have put India in a position from where it can look China in the eye with strength. If acquisition of S-400, Rafael, Apache, Chinook, Globemaster, and Hercules in recent years from Russia, France, and the US is any indication, India is on the right path of building its strength through important strategic partnerships in time to face renewed and recurring challenges from China. The current standoff in Ladakh is a test of will in which India has dared to stand up against China's bullying tactics. This is an opportunity for Indian leadership to let the standoff continue into 2021, galvanise the Northeast and Ladakh regions with the nation and use the immense power of a country of 1300 million for security, peace and development of the India and the world. India now has a sagacious 'higher direction of war'.

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Illegal Immigration in Assam and Indian Security Concerns in North-East Region

Rajneesh Kumar Gupta & Raj Kumar^{*}

Abstract

Indian security concerns in North-East region are complex and deep in nature. It is the region surrounded by many countries, China in the north, Bangladesh in the south, Myanmar in the east and Bhutan in the north-west. India has been facing many issues with these countries including border and water dispute, infiltration of illegal immigrants, cross-border terrorism and so on. The North-East region has always been a soft target for different groups like separatists, terrorists, anti-India forces, and also neighboring countries like China and Bangladesh (earlier East Pakistan) who tried their best to create the situation of unrest and divide in the region.

The present paper focuses on illegal immigration in Assam from the perspective of Indian security concerns in North- East region. It examines the threats coming into North East region from bordering countries, China, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. It argues that while Chinese motives pose strategic challenge to India in the North East region, influx of illegal immigrants in Assam is a major cause of concern for Indian national security. In the past, it could be a mere human mobility but over the period, it is being propelled by anti-national outfits with the hidden intention of balkanizing India. India needs a comprehensive mechanism to deal with this problem.

Keywords: Illegal Immigration, Security, North-East, Assam, East Pakistan, Bangladesh, Panchsheel.

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Introduction

India's security concerns in North-East region are very complex and deep in nature and thus its important to figure out various aspects which are relevant to understand the Indian concerns. India has a distinct socio-cultural, geographical and historical background which is result of its unique past events and situations it has faced. The North-East region of India is surrounded by many countries, China from north, Bangladesh from south, Myanmar from east and Bhutan from north-west side. The region has many issues with all of these countries at different point of times. Its difficult to understand the complexities behind Indian security concerns in the North-East region without having proper information about bilateral relations of India with these countries sharing borders with the region. India has many issues with these countries including border and water dispute, infiltration of illegal immigrants, cross-border terrorism and so on.

When we talk about security concerns in North-East region, we cannot ignore the role of China, which is creating problems since the independence of India. India has always been keen to have friendly relations with its neighbours and has pursued the policy of non-interference in the matter of other nations. First Prime Minister of India, Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru signed an agreement with China on 24 April 1954, Panchsheel, which had five elements- (i) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (ii) Mutual non-aggression; (iii) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (iv) Equality and mutual benefit, and (v) Peaceful co-existence (Verma, 1989). But the agreement was breached by China and India witnessed massive Chinese aggression in 1962. China has also been involved in propelling insurgency in the North-East region of India. Insurgent groups like Naga, MNF, ULFA, PLA, ATTF, NDFB etc. get substantial support from Beijing. After the 'Cultural revolution' of China in 1966, rebels of the North-East received massive financial support and training for the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' (Manoharan, 2012). Prakash (2008) refers to a letter written by Scato Swu, "Kedhage", a self-proclaimed President of

so-called 'Federal Government of Nagaland', to the President of People's Republic of China on 5 May 1966 in which he states,

" ... as it has become impossible for us to resist unaided the military might of Indian Armed Forces, we have to look to your Government and to your people for any possible assistance in any form so that we may properly safeguard our sovereignty through the liberal hand of your people. Our government feels the paramount necessity of your kind recognition of the existence of the Naga nation and the legality of the Federal Government of Nagaland" (Manoharan, 2012).

The idea of universal brotherhood has been at the core of Indian wisdom since ages as our ancestors believed in *Vasudaiv Kutumbkam* (entire world is one family). Thus, we pursued a policy of welcoming everyone coming to our land in search of better life opportunities with the ethos of '*Atithi Devo Bhavah*' which resulted in the influx of people into India from various parts of the world, enriching its cultural diversity. In fact, anthropological scrutiny of India reveals that it is the land of immigrants since ages and cosmopolitan society exist here since the ancient period. However, partition of India at the time of independence led to the emergence of some specific problems related to immigration. It is a matter of fact that there has been a free flow of people from Bengal to the regions of North-East in the pre-independence era but because of partition, East Bengal became part of Pakistan. Therefore, movement of people from this region to North- East became international migration which required passport and visa clearances as per international law. Due to better prospects in India, many people migrated from then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to India without following the rules/norms which is continued for long. Over the period of time, this migration also got connected with the problem of proxy war, illegal transfer of goods and people, cross border, money laundering and transnational terrorism which have created the problem of insurgency, internal and national insecurity,

demographic imbalance and the problem of resource allocation in the North-Eastern states.

In subsequent years, Assam became the soft target for separatists and terror organizations. Many of them are also harbouring the dream to balkanize India and attain separate nationhood for this region. When we discuss security concerns in Assam, we find direct and indirect threats emerging out of external and internal factors. On the one side, there are few direct threats that try to influence Indian sovereignty and integrity, for instance terrorism and separatism, and some other indirect threats are also there which help the functioning of major factors for instance terrorist funding, human and drug trafficking and other criminal activities.

India is facing various kinds of challenges in the North-East region from neighbouring countries like China, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. The region has been considered as a long hanging fruits by those who are trying to capture it since starting. Because of its geographical and cultural distinctness, China and Bangladesh have adopted different tactics to influence the region. On the one side, China is actively running the fake propaganda of connecting some parts of Indian Territory with it. China claimed Arunachal Pradesh and some other parts of North- East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and captured some parts of NEFA illegally during India-China war in 1962. On the other side, Bangladesh is supporting the idea of lebensraum to claim its right over Assamese land to settle migrants from Bangladesh. India is facing such security concerns from these countries since starting. The formation of East Pakistan and Bangladesh made situation more complex because of the decrease in the routes of land connectivity with the North East. India has just one narrow pathway to the North-East, which is also called 'Chicken's Neck'. It is around 22 Km wide Siliguri corridor, which is a part of West Bengal in between Nepal and Bangladesh.

India is trying to solve this problem by creating a friendly environment in the region with its neighboring countries. India tried to solve the border issues with China through Panchsheel

Agreement (1954), which failed after the Chinese attack and capturing of Indian Territory during 1962 war. India also tried to solve the issues with Bangladesh by adapting different strategies like Enclave transfer, development oriented bilateral relations and border management. On the other hand, South-Asia and South-East Asia are strategically very important for India and China both, India is trying to make good ties with these regions to establish a good relation of mutual cooperation and respect to ensure a support system and helping hand for development. In this regard, India has tried to build Indo-Burma Barrier to seal India-Myanmar border to control border crimes like smuggling of goods and drugs, money laundry, illegal arms supply, illegal immigration etc.

India's North-East region and Myanmar have a distinct historical connection, during the first half of 20th century, when India was under the British control and North- East was run by different rulers, Burma (Now Myanmar) tried to capture the North Eastern states but King of Assam met British rulers to seek help and Britishers defeated Burma and later and also included North-East into India. Yet, managing Indo- Myanmar border is a challenging task because of its precarious conditions but India is trying to figure out what solutions could be possible in this regard. India is trying to make good and cooperative relations with South Asian countries because it tends to achieve its national and international interest to counter Chinese hegemony in the region. Myanmar plays the role of a buffer state in the region between India and China and India tried to make good relations with it, for ensuring its national interest in the region with maximizing security and support for North-East. Myanmar is a member of BIMSTEC, ASEAN, Mekong Ganga cooperation and an observer state in SAARC, India tends to make good relations with it in the background of these cooperative organizations.

India is also working under the policy of "Look East" which later transformed into "Act East" to ensure support and security from the region to counter China on the one side and to minimize issues with South Asia and South East Asian countries. Such initiatives are very much needed to solve the problem. Myint-U

(2011) has also discuss these issues about how India, China and other countries in the region are functioning.

On the other hand, Bangladesh also emerged as a source of national insecurity just after its formation, which was helped and guided by Indian government in 1971. While discussing security concerns in the state of Assam, we cannot undermine the issues of illegal immigration, which is one of the most influential factor and source of security threat to the national security of India. Assam is facing the problem of illegal immigration since the pre- independence period but the problem became more complex after the independence and division when immigration became transnational.

Roy (2006) argues that “unlike in the past, the illegal migrants from Bangladesh could now be used to cause security problems in the North-East. Existing linkages between Pak ISI and Bangladeshi (BD) fundamentalist and terrorist groups are being strengthened. Approach of BD government is becoming increasingly anti-India and pro-Pak. It does not bode well for us.”

In case of illegal migration to India, most serious concern arises from Bangladesh. This paper focuses on the illegal migration in Assam from Bangladesh and its consequences to the national security of India.

Security concerns for Assam

According to the World Migration Report (2020), Bangladesh-India migration corridor was the third largest human influx in Asian countries in 2019. The estimated number of people crossing the political boundaries through this corridor was over 3 million. The report states that India is home to significant population of irregular migrants from Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka (United Nations, 2020). It is crystal clear that the trend of illegal migration from Bangladesh to India is continued and there has been evidences of involvement of those in the activities impersonating security concerns for India in general and particularly in North-East region.

Joseph and Narendran (2013) deal with different perspectives of India and Bangladesh on border issues and tries to find out how

these two counterparts look at each other in this regard. Here they argue that India sees Bangladesh as “Trio of Security Concern”, where entry of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, their role in trans-border terrorism and disputes related to geographical boundaries are of main concerns (Joseph & Narendran, 2013).

On the other hand, Ray (2006) discusses the NCAER (National Council of Applied Economic Research) which is related to study regarding the smuggling in the areas of West Bengal and Assam. He mentions a research, which shows that basic commodities like cycle and livestock etc are smuggled from Bangladesh and it also includes arms, gold and narcotics, which is one of the biggest challenges in front of Indian government, in context of border management. He argues that we are unable to stop smuggling of these goods and materials, how can we think of curbing the movement of people?

Illegal Infiltration and insurgency in Assam

Here it becomes important to discuss that from the pre-independence period Assam has been a soft target for separatists' and supporters of two nation theory. Different people tried to shatter it because of its adjacent border condition with Bangladesh, there were many separatist and anti-India forces that were working to divide Assam and supporting the idea of inclusion of Assam into East Pakistan and Bangladesh. As Onkareshwar Pandey (2006) talks about increasing Islamic terror activities in the North Eastern region and tries to find out its links with terrorist groups like ISI. He believes that infiltration is one of the gravest threats in front of India and it is posing challenges to the integrity and sovereignty of Indian state. Here it is important to know that problem of illegal migration is planned, organized and run by selective organizations and its supporters which are seating in Pakistan under the conspiracy to divide Assam from India. Pandey quotes Moinul Haq Choudhary who was working with Mohammad Ali Jinnah for partition, he was the person who supported the idea of two nations but later on decided to stay in

Assam because of his agenda to divide Assam from India, and he said that, "Within a decade, I shall be able to annex Assam to East Pakistan by the dint of more infiltration of Muslims there..."

Not just some propagators of two nation theory but prominent leaders like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto also gave same kind of statements, as in the book 'The Myth of Independence', he wrote,

"Our controversy with India is not on the problem of Kashmir only; there is the problem of Assam. In Assam, there are some Muslim majority districts which should have been given to Pakistan at the time of the partition; these districts were wrongly included in India"

These comments and emergence of militant organizations have proved us that we cannot look at the problem of infiltration a single and one dimensional yet it is multi dimensional problem, which is connected to some other factors like partition, separatism and terrorism. It shows that few organizations had a dream of dividing Assam, which resulted in the evolution of insurgency in the state.

K.P.S. Gill (2006), on the other hand, talks of the worsened situation during 1960s when process of identification, detection and deportation started taking place and illegal immigrants started attacking Hindus. He argues that illegal migration or infiltration into north-east is a big challenge for India, even bigger than terrorism and other activities. He argues that this migration is planned and organized by people from other side; on the one side this migration initially took place after the 1937 elections when idea of "grow more Muslims" emerged and later on, Bengali speaking people, during the reorganization of state on the basis of linguistic ground, mentioned their language as Bengali to get superiority over Assamese but after the movement by locals, government had to accept Assamese as state language.

Lt. Gen. (Ret.) S.K. Sinha (1998) mentioned,

"As a result of population movement from Bangladesh, the specter looms large of the indigenous people of Assam being

reduced to a minority in their home state. Their cultural survival will be in jeopardy, their political control will be weakened and their employment opportunities will be undermined. This silent and invidious demographic invasion of Assam may result in loss of the geostrategically vital districts of Lower Assam (on the border with Bangladesh). The influx of illegal migrants is turning these districts into a Muslim majority region. It will then only be a matter of time when a demand for their merger with Bangladesh may be made. The rapid growth of international Islamic fundamentalism may provide the driving force for this demand... Loss of Lower Assam (the area close to the Bangladesh) will sever the entire land mass of the North-East from the rest of India and the rich natural resources of the region will be lost to the Nation” (Kumar, 2010).

Because of these issues, illegal immigration is increasing continuously and different steps taken by government were not able to stop it. Bhuyan (2006) discusses the population growth of different districts of Assam in different decades (Table-1).

Table-1 : District Wise Population Growth Rate from 1971 to 1991.

State/ Districts	Growth rate of Muslims from 1971-1991	Estimated decadal growth rate of Muslims, from 1971-1981 and 1981-1991.
Assam	77.42	33.20
Dhubri	71.13	30.83
Kolkrajhar	100.83	41.71
Bongaigaon	92.78	38.83
Goalpara	86.52	36.58
Barpeta	65.19	28.52
Nalbari	93.40	39.06
Darrang	108.10	44.25
Sonitpur	131.73	52.23
Marigaon	70.26	30.47
Nagaon	81.91	34.86

Source: (Bhuyan, 2006, p. 86).

This continuous infiltration has created many problems in front of the state and central governments as mentioned by Gohain &

Borpuzari (2013), who argue that problem of illegal immigration is creating some challenges in front of the state in the form of economy, social environment and law and order. They also raise the issue of fear of indigenous people to be reduced to a minority in their own state because many districts have been changed to Muslim majority districts. Here, it is important to discuss impact of illegal immigration on the Tribal communities of the North-East, which later gave birth to the turmoil in the region.

Vohra (2006) talks about the condition of tribal communities in different states of North-East, he discusses the impact of infiltration on the demographic profile of tribal region which has been sensitive in the matter of tribal aspirations to govern their own state. He says that “the local tribal population had a given percentage in 1947, a given percentage when Tripura became free, and you see their percentage today, they are reduced to a minority. Obviously they cannot digest the situation, much more so when the politics of the day highlights these aspects and these issues to create further dissatisfaction and confrontation and violence”.

Because of all these issues, Assamese people started Assam Movement in 1979 to raise the issues of local population of Assam and their insecurities, on the other side, separatist groups also started insurgent activities. Because of these insurgent activities, Assam had to face a huge loss in the form of civilians and security personnel as mentioned by Sanjeeb Baruah (Table-2).

Table-2: Insurgency- related Mortality in Assam, 2005-2008

Year	Incidents	Civilians	Security Forces	Suspected Insurgents	Total
2005	398	173	7	74	254
2006	413	164	32	46	242
2007	500	286	24	129	439
2008	NA	244	18	125	387

Source: (Baruah, 2009, p. 968).

Indian government later took some strong decisions which put a stop on the insurgent activities in the region but it did not get success in solving the problem.

Terrorist and separatist organizations in the region and security concerns

Roy (2006) deals with different debates over illegal immigration from different perspectives. He argues that infiltrates are employed by Pakistan. Intelligence agencies of Pakistan like ISI are working for spreading Islamisation in the South Asian region and WIT (Worldwide Islamic Terrorism). He argues that if Muslims are in majority in some place, they try to control the land and evict Hindus from there; in the process, they use different tools and techniques like dacoities, killings and riots, which create disorder and chaos. He criticizes functioning of political parties who tend to use these infiltrates for their benefits; they use them as their vote bank without thinking about its effect on the national security apparatus of India. He further argues, "Bangladesh agencies, including BDR, often provide advance information to the Indian terrorist groups, present in Bangladesh, about their plans to conduct raids on their camps, which they have to do for the consumption of international community" (Roy, 2006).

Another aspect is related to the fear of identity loss in the minds of locals who are being affected by the increase in the population of foreigners, which is being resulted in the form of socio-economic, cultural and political imbalance. Assam is facing such problems since starting but situation became worse when terrorist and militant organizations started using Muslim population for their benefits. It led to the increase in the threat of Islamisation to the locals, which later resulted in the emergence of counter-activities from the locals. In this regard, Mrinal Kumar Saikia in his article "Assam towards Islamisation" (1996) argues that Assam is suffering from the fear of Islamisation and common people of Assam are afraid in the matter (Pandey, 2006).

It is important to point that there are many organizations who are working here with different intentions. On the one side, there are some separatist organizations who are working to divide Assam from India. Some others are working to ensure socio-cultural, political and economic influence of locals. On the other hand,

some terrorist organizations are also working to create a link with separatist organizations to wage proxy war against India. In this regard Sanjeeb Baruah (2009) draws attention towards the separatist organizations who demanded the expulsion of infiltrates from Assam, also have confronted the government. ULFA (ULFA is a radical organization which tends to make changes in the Assamese society radically).

These issues are of national importance for India because, while forming policies, we cannot neglect them, nexus of anti-India forces is going to harm the sovereignty and integrity of India that's why it becomes very important for the government to look into the matter from this point of view.

Indian government initiatives to solve the problem

Earlier, colonial masters and Indian leaders were not much concerned about the increasing problem of illegal immigration but slowly they became active after the issue became more problematic and complex. Assam government tried to solve the issue by passing the law of Prevention of Infiltration from Pakistani (PIP) to solve the issue but it did not get much success.

On the other side, Sanjib Barooah (1994) discusses the functioning of organizations like, ULFA, its challenges to India and steps taken by Indian government to counter the problem. He talks about the efforts of Indian government to solve the issue by deporting illegal immigrants to Bangladesh and the debate of human rights violations while deporting. He argues that militant activities came down in 1990s when anti-insurgency acts were done by the government of India which gave birth to the debate of law and order and human rights. Baruah here discusses the seriousness of threats posted by these organizations; he argues that these organizations created problems in the pathways of functioning of political and legal institutions of India and tried to give birth to regime crises in the state (Barooah, 1994).

Later, local people themselves took the action in form of Bideshi Khedao Movement, also known as Assam movement for the

preservation of Assam from illegal immigrants who were getting political and other kind of support. At the end of this movement, Assam accord was signed to ensure the rights and autonomy of Assamese people and preservation of their culture and identity. Different steps were taken here to solve the problem, that got success in some area but it did not get success in solving the problem.

Indian government has tried to solve other border related issues also, as by transferring of enclaves with Bangladesh. There were around 51 enclaves of Bangladesh in Indian region and 111 enclaves of India in Bangladeshi region, Indian government initiated the transfer of these enclaves, physically from 31st July 2015 during the visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Bangladesh in 2015. Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) was also further expanded and transfer of enclaves was planned. It is important to know here that, only 989 out of 38,521 people from former Indian Enclaves in Bangladesh opted to hold on their original nationality and others chosen India to settle down, which is a huge number. It shows that people are more interested in getting Indian citizenship rather than Bangladeshi. On the other side, all 14,863 people of Bangladeshi enclaves in India opted to stay in India with Indian citizenship.

At the end, NRC (National Register of Citizen) was updated in the second decade of 20th century to identify and deport illegal immigrants from Assam; the functioning of NRC was made faster after the formation of BJP government. Different tools and mechanisms were adapted to make procedure of identification easy and better.

Besides aforementioned initiatives government has taken many decisions to stop the inflow by border management like increasing border policing, clear marking of border areas and border fencing. In this regard, Prakash Singh (2006) argues that “there are borders where intensive vigilance is required as we have along the Pakistan border because of cross border terrorism or across the

Bangladesh border because of the human waves that keep on trying to cross the borders.”

India has always pursued the policy of peaceful co-existence and non-intervention in the line of ‘Panchsheel’ and ‘Bandung’ declaration. Further, it has given special emphasis on building cordial relations and enhancing ties with neighbourhood for mutual benefits. Indian Prime Minister Ms. Indira Gandhi rendered full support to the liberation movement of Bangladesh and in 1972 both countries signed ‘Treaty of Friendship and Peace’. India played key role in the establishment of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). To boost bilateral contacts India granted Bangladesh a perpetual lease over the Tin Bigha corridor, covering an area of 1.5 hectares. Further, Indian Prime Minister IK Gujral pursued policy of unilateral concessions to neighbouring countries referred as ‘Gujral Doctrine’. However, these efforts have been often looked with speculations in Bangladesh. The assassination of Mujibur-ur-Rehman in 1975, and the assumption of power by General Zia-ur-Rahman brought fundamental changes in Bangladesh. Now, India was seen as ‘threat’ and Zia-ur-Rahman preferred to embrace Islamic ideology bringing the nation closer to Pakistan. Subsequently, the Awami League which has positive approach towards India is branded as India’s ‘stooge’. On the other hand, the Bangladeshi Nationalist Party emphasized on asserts on ‘Islamic identity’. Thus, we see periodical changes in the policies and perception of Bangladesh about India largely guided by the ideology of ruling political parties (Pant, 2007). Similarly, in India issues of illegal migrants have been seen from the perspectives of loss and gains in the electoral gimmick by different political actors making the issue more complex which poses a severe threat to the national security of India.

Conclusion

North-East region has always been a soft target for different groups like separatists, terrorists and anti-India forces, and also by neighboring countries like China and Bangladesh (earlier East

Pakistan) which had tried their best to create the situation of unrest and divide in the North-Eastern states. Because of these intentions, they have adopted different tactics to influence Indian security apparatus. Earlier China tried to put pressure on Indian government on the matter of Tibet and later it started neglecting Line of Actual Control and started proclaiming ownership over different regions of Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, India. Later, India had to face a war in 1962 without preparations. From then, China is trying to impact India in different ways, by providing help and funding to Pakistan for terrorist activities. China also tends to encompass India in the matter of Jammu & Kashmir by raising this issue in international arena. On the other side, Pakistan and Bangladesh are two other enemies, who are working to influence Indian security apparatus, directly or indirectly. Pakistan is the main proponent of terrorism into India, which uses its boundaries and Bangladesh as the sources of infiltration of terrorists into India. It has saved different terrorist leaders at different point of times and also encouraged and funded different separatist groups of India. Bangladesh also has a dream of diving Assam and including it into Bangladesh. India is clearly facing this kind of security threats from these countries and supporting illegal migration to military invasion in North-Eastern states like Assam and Arunachal Pradesh.

Here we should keep in mind that illegal infiltration is not the only problem, there are several similar issues which are equally dangerous and needs comprehensive mechanism for its resolution. Issue of demographic imbalance, over consumption of natural resources, environment degradation, unwanted change in the voting pattern and behavior and insurgency are also there. These issues are directly related to the issue of illegal infiltration, which remained a huge matter of concern for the security apparatus of India. India is facing many challenges in dealing the problem of insecurity in the region because of its distinct geographical, cultural and historical condition; enemy countries have tried different tactics to influence the region but did not get success. India has taken many steps to deal with these aspects

and to create a peaceful and friendly environment in the region. Formation of Ministry of Development of North East Region (MODNER) and later providing it the status of full-fledged ministry, formation of good bilateral relations with neighboring and South Asian and South East Asian countries are few of them.

India needs to adopt more comprehensive and holistic approach to deal with the issue by keeping the multi dimensional nature of border issues with its neighboring countries and complex border management conditions in mind. India should focus on the problem solving approach by tightening its borders, stopping illegal movement of people, smuggling of goods, illegal arms and narcotics to confront and control illegal and criminal activities in the region so that point of security can be achieved. Here, India should target those weak areas from where infiltration takes place. Government should strengthen the mechanism like NRC for identification of infiltrates and should also ensure the deportation of these infiltrates by forcing Bangladesh to accept them through international pressure and bilateral relations. On the other hand, we need to counter the chained system of infiltration, in which former infiltrates help new infiltrates in settling down in the North-Eastern states of India. Increasing border patrolling and policing is very important to control the inflow and protect the Indian boundaries. On the other side, India should also try to break the nexus between Pakistan and Bangladesh based terrorist organisations and Indian separatist groups.

Aforementioned issues and complexities are long lasting in nature and are clearly result of historical events and circumstances where we see reluctance in the attitude towards the solution of issues and lack of political will to resolve the issues in historical past, which has resulted in the complexity in contemporary time. But recent government has taken few important steps to curb the problem, either in the form of bilateral talks or talks at regional platforms, which has given us a hope of brightness in the deep darkness of unresolved issues.

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Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Maritime Security: An Indian Perspective

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Abstract:

China's increasing expansionist approach in the South China Sea has a security concern for the littoral countries and maritime trade, and poses a challenge to international legal regimes. These concerns in the South China Sea today have been well integrated into the broad fulcrum of security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. The increasing volume of trade and consequent more dependency on maritime route by major economic powers and international players like Japan, Australia, India and the US have necessitated for a coordinated approach for safeguarding sea-lane security, free movement of ships and overall peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. In this context, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD) or Quadrilateral (Quad) is a potential force to reckon with. India's robust bilateral economic and strategic relationship with other three member countries, and Pacific region as a whole, makes a great sense for India's maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region. However, in the process, there are issues involved in giving a concrete shape to the agenda and objectives of the QSD. There is a mushrooming growth in the forum; but needs a structured guideline for a sustainable mutual cooperation on maritime security, trade interests and geostrategic leverages.

Key words: Security, Maritime, geostrategic, naval exercise, Indo-Pacific.

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Introduction:

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD) is a forum of four major economic and international players in the Indo-Pacific region which include India, the USA, Australia and Japan. Its activities include organising conferences and summits, information exchange and military exercises. The consultations among the member countries include, "Cooperation in the areas of better connectivity and networks, sustainable development, combating-terrorism, maritime security, cyber security and non-proliferation challenges with a focus on promoting peace, prosperity and stability in an increasingly inter-dependence and inter-connectivity of the Indo-Pacific region" (Ministry of External Affairs, 2019). The QSD with its broader attributes has turned as a forum of security engagement, regional economic platform and development initiative (CSIS Briefs, 2020). However, this growth of QSD itself is a gradual convergence instead of a rapid institutionalization. The idea of QSD was initiated in 2007 by the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, joined by American Vice President Dick Cheney, Australian Prime Minister John Howard and Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh. It was established as an informal strategic and security dialogue forum of the member countries (Chand, 2018). Since then a large number of combined naval exercises have been conducted, well known as Malabar Exercise, and other such exercises. This diplomatic, strategic and military approach among the four nations was largely a response to Beijing's economic and strategic leverage and military pressure in the Pacific Ocean region. However, in 2008, Australia had withdrawn from the forum due to protest from China, and thus there was a slowdown of progress of the forum. Yet, in 2017, there was a move for a united effort for the common cause. Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi, American President Donald Trump, Prime Minister of Australia Malcolm Turnbull and Shinzo Abe, the Prime Minister of Japan, looked for the revival of the security pact in Manila on the sideline of the 31st ASEAN Summit and East Asian Summit, largely due to

growing tensions in South China Sea-caused by aggressive geopolitical, territorial and regional pursuits by China. The press release of the meeting stressed for a “free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region and combating terrorism” (Bej, 2017). Since 2017, the member countries are meeting regularly and working jointly on the issues of common interest. In March 2020, amid COVID-19 pandemic, the Quad met for the preparation of a roadmap to deal the crisis situation caused by the pandemic. Significantly, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and Vietnam also joined the meeting. Maritime security, maritime connectivity, health security, humanitarian assistance and combating terrorism are the broader areas of cooperation of the Quad. In a very recent development, Shinzo Abe has surfaced the idea of 'Democratic Security Diamond' to protect the maritime commons-stretching from Indian Ocean to Pacific region-well known as Indo-Pacific for the QSD nations (Javaid, 2020). Security is an acknowledgement of the fact, according to American Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, includes, “Economic capability and rule of law, protection of intellectual property, trade arrangements, diplomatic engagements, and all the necessary elements which form a security structure, not just military but deeper in nature and extent” (<https://www.moneycontrol.com>, 2020). Outcomes of the various Quad meetings, so far, include: a rule-based structure in the Indo-Pacific region; discussions on collective cooperation for an open, free, and all-encompassing Indo-Pacific region; and global respect to international regimes, freedom of navigation, and overflight facilities (www.insightsonindia.com, 2019). The establishment of QSD, from the Indian perspective, is largely due to increasing sphere of influence of China in the Indo-Pacific region. Beijing has been claiming almost entire South China Sea under its Nine-Dash Line and established its military base in Djibouti and developed Gwadar port in Pakistan, while developing Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, and having initiated for artificial islands in the Maldives, and virtually criticised the Quad as the “Asian NATO” (Javaid, 2020).

India's stakes

India's reluctance in the past to make Quad a military alliance was largely because of its strong adherence to NAM perspectives. But the renewed and pragmatic momentum of QSD in contemporary time is largely due to India's "buy-in approach." Jayant Prasad, an Indian diplomat said, "Beijing's belligerence has been forcing India for a tougher position" (www.moneycontrol.com, 2020). Therefore, the conduct of Malabar exercises has become imminent. The exercise conducted in two stages-The Bay of Bengal exercise conducted during September 26- October 4, 2019 and the maritime exercise involving Quad members in November 3-6 and November 17-20, 2019. The broader objectives of all Quad members included free, unhindered access and open navigation in the Indo-Pacific region. Former Foreign Secretary of India Kanwal Sibal hailed the forum as non- military alliance, yet enjoys closer security understanding and intelligence sharing. According to S. Jaishankar, the External Affairs Minister of India, "India is quietly forging robust ties with all the members, even at the bilateral level" (www.moneycontrol.com, 2020). This can be best illustrated through an enhanced Indo-US security engagement in recent times. In a new twist, India has invited Vietnam to become a member of the forum. Congruent to it, Vietnam considers of filing a legal complaint in the international court against Beijing's South China Sea claim. Vietnam, along with other countries like New Zealand and South Korea, has taken part in an online 'Quad plus' conference. The increasing tension between India and China across the border region and land-grabbing approach of China prompts India to have closer ties with other Quad members so as to choke the entry points of China in the strategic locations or straits of the Indo-Pacific region.

There are important strategic reasons which implies prominence of QSD in India's quest for maritime security. First, for Beijing, maritime space is crucial for its trade routes that stretches from the South China Sea in the Pacific region to the entire Indian Ocean region-connecting Africa, Asia and Australia. There are also

many choke points like Malacca Strait or “Malacca Dilemma”. So, any military adventurism by China against India may result in India along with other countries to block the maritime trade route of China. Second, since there is bonhomie of China-Pakistan relationship, Quad is a counter strategy to this maritime security challenge. Third, with the inception of Indo-Pacific, the maritime security gains prominence in a larger context. Since India is central to Indo-Pacific region, India’s prominence is well recognised in QSD. Fourth, it is of common interest for India and other Quad members to check the expansionist pursuits of China in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, thus ensuring maritime interests of all four countries. Thus, by prioritising “Act East Policy as the cornerstone of it’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific,” New Delhi has pointed out Quad as an extension of this policy. However, New Delhi is yet to define and demarcate it’s maritime pursuits in the East. In 2015, India restructured its maritime doctrine, titled, “Ensuring Securing Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy” that talked for an actionable plan and policy. Consequently, “New Delhi made port calls in Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, and undertaken maritime capacity building efforts (beyond training) in Vietnam and Myanmar” (Bej, 2017). India, so far, has made annual naval drills with other countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The Malabar exercises, along with America and subsequently Japan have drawn the most of the attention. The use of INS Vikramaditya, the aircraft carrier of India, flat-top Nimitz of US, and JS Izumo, the helicopter carrier of Japan, during July 10-17, 2017, indicated that Malabar exercises have expanded military potential, confidence building, and geopolitical ambit. In their operations, activities included surface drills, anti-submarine warfare practices, coordinated air defence practices, and the Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) drills. As a part of its core interest in East Asia, India joined Japan as a permanent and regular member of Malabar exercise (Bej, 2017). The Malabar exercise today includes a quadrilateral maritime exercise that involves the India, America, Japan and Australia. Started between India and America

in 1992, the naval exercise in 2015 included Japan as a permanent member, and New Delhi conducted bilateral naval and maritime security exercise AUSINDEX with Canberra (Ministry of External Affairs, 2019).

Bilateral Engagements

In the context of Japan, India sees the QSD as a platform to take the next step ahead of a potential engagement. Japan is suspicious of China's ties with North Korea, the arch-rival of South Korea—a strong ally of Japan. Further, Japan is worried of China's aggressive ambitions and there are many territorial or island disputes between the two countries. Therefore, Japan is looking for a security umbrella that will well check Chinese aggression and contain Chinese hegemony in the region. In a more strategic and security perspective, "India-Japan 2+2 Ministerial Agreements included GSOMIA, Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services; Dialogues on defence policy, joint research on UGVs and robotics technology; Staff talks at all three services; and Bilateral military exercises such as JIMEX, DHARMA GUARDIAN, SHINYUU MAITRI, SAHYOG-KAIJIN" (Brookings, 2020). By expressing Indo-Pacific Ocean as a "single strategic arena", Rex Tillerson, the US Secretary of State, hailed New Delhi and Washington as "regional bookends." This implies that the US is looking forward for a bigger and more effective role of New Delhi in consolidating and promoting regional stability and maritime security, and thus balancing Beijing. Specifically, India-US relations can be best explained through various engagements such as, "2+2 Minister Agreements that include GSOMIA, LEMOA, COMCASA, ISA, HOSTAC; Dialogues on defence policy, defence technology and trade and maritime security; Joint training of peacekeepers and Indian liaison at NAVCENT; Bilateral military exercises include, VAJRA PRAHAR, YUDH ABHYAS, COPE INDIA, Tiger TRIUMPH; Defence deals comprised C-17, C-130J, P-81, M777, SIG716, AH-64E, CH-47 (I), MH-60R, and Strategic Authorisation-1 for India" (Brookings, 2020). In a very recent development, the US Senate has passed a resolution condemning Chinese Aggression in Galwan Valley and China's aggressive

approach to alter status quo at the LAC. The Senators John Cornyn and Mark Warner, who introduced the resolution commended for improvement of a secured Indian telecommunications establishments so as to detect and thwart Chinese movements across the volatile border points of Depsang Plains, Galwan Valley, Hot Springs, and Pangong, and advocated for a stronger bilateral and multilateral engagements like QSD where a rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific region could be achieved (Jha, 2020). In short, the US outreach strategy involved President Barack Obama's 'Pivot to Asia' and Donald Trump's 'Indo-Pacific' partnership which implied US strategies for better integration in East Asia, akin to New Delhi's 'Look East', and recently 'Act East' policy of Narendra Modi government. Further, of the QSD, India has less maritime or naval connectivity with Australia. Yet, with India having a pivotal role in the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), in 2017, the Indian warships INS Kamorta, INS Shivalik and INS Jyoti arrived in Western Australia's Freemantle port city for a joint exercise. Australia in its outreach under IOR-ARC has started economic partnership with Seychelles and Mauritius under its "blue economy" project that includes exploration of oil and natural gas resources. Crucially, both Seychelles and Mauritius are strong economic and strategic partners of India. Along with, Australia is well known for its mining resources and exploration technologies such as coal and underwater exploration. This can be well illustrated through the Indian companies like Adani group. Both India and Australia are trying to establish a free trade arrangement with India and thus promotion of a blue economy. In a more strategic way, India-Australia relationship can be best explained through various bilateral engagements such as Australia-India "2+2 Ministerial Agreements on Mutual Logistics Support, and Information Sharing Agreement; Dialogues include defence policy, defence research, material collaborations and maritime security (+Indonesia); Staff talks at all the three services; Joint military exercise of AUSINDEX, and AUSTRA HIND;

and Participation of India in Australian exercises such as PITCH BLACK, KAKADU” (Brookings, 2020).

Challenges and Prospect

All the QSD members are well aware of the fact that the Chinese approaches and actions are detrimental or near detrimental to their mutual interests. Yet, they have not reached at a point of common cooperation. According to the American Security Project, “Without a clear and unified objective, there runs the risk that the Quad will break up for a second time; in other words, another win for China” (American Security Project, 2020). Some of the important issues that the forum is facing today are mentioned here. First, there is no clear cut structure and agenda on which direction it will move. Second, the members affected by Beijing’s economic and military preparedness are reluctant to announce a joint statement against Beijing’s expansionist approach. Third, the trade and transaction of China with US, India, Australia and Japan is so much inter-wined that it proves difficult to take a decisive stand against China. Fourth, the role is largely confined to bureaucratic level, and lacks regular meetings (Kirubakaran, 2020). Therefore, it is necessary to take some more effective steps. Firstly, regular talks on defence cooperation and infrastructure collaboration. Second, Indo-Pacific cooperation on economic aspects. Third, setting up a working committee to execute the outcomes of meetings. Fourth, regular meetings of the defence staff of all the member countries. Fifth, while China is advocating for separation of security aspects from economic relations, the member countries of the forum must justify how both security and economy are inextricably intertwined. Fifth, increasing ties bilaterally while pursuing for a collective effort. Sixth, access opportunities, and production and development of defence equipments and technology. Sixth, maritime awareness, and development of logistics thereupon. Seventh, development of infrastructure and defence that is based on rule-based order which has been undermined by China (Lee, 2020). Eighth, the member countries should carry forward the step to the level of deepening military and strategic engagements among themselves

that can well intend to counter and deter future attempts of Beijing to imbalance the existing status quo, and thus development of a credible maritime deterrence. Ninth, joint cooperation for interoperability, larger intelligence sharing, surveillance and reconnaissance, and the logistics. Tenth, cooperation for a standard setting, and establishment of an “Indo-Pacific Quadrilateral Critical Infrastructure Funding” that can act as a viable option to counter China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) where Beijing can use other states for power projection in future (Lee, 2020).

Conclusion

From the above analysis, we can say that the QSD or Quad has tuned and turned as a strategic and security move largely to fulfil the common interests of the member countries which can be summarised here. First, establishment of stability or maintain balance of power in the region and thus preventing a littoral or any other country from becoming aggressive or dominant. Second, establishing a maritime order-based on free movement and transportation of goods and services. Third, shared interest for deterring a country that wants to resolve the issues forcefully. Fourth, rule-based economic order which includes free and open trade and investment, competitive tendering, and execution of rule of law. Fifth, supporting, consolidating and promoting liberal democratic values and good governance in the Indo-Pacific region. Sixth, the Indo-Pacific Quad is a strategic and security balance to Belt and Road Initiative of China. Therefore, the QSD is an opportunity and avenue for like-minded countries to share their ideas and concerns and collaborate on programmes and projects of common interest. Definitely, open and free maritime movement in the Indo-Pacific is the motto of all the nations concerned. Cooperation has already begun in development, maritime and economic projects of the member countries. The skirmish, territorial tensions and conflicts have become the order of the South China Sea in the form of island disputes, land grabbing, confrontations, which are largely emanated from the expansionist China. Hence, the QSD is on its way to materialise

the interests of all the stakeholders. India should be proactive in guarding its maritime interest against the aggressive China and its designs as well. Although the QSD countries do not explicitly indicate China, yet their behaviour and actions indicate that it is a force against the imperialist ambitions of China. As discussed earlier, India has every reason to strengthen QSD or Quad. The Galwan clash and ongoing tension in the north eastern part of India are the fresh reminders for a united and effective force to contain and counter expansionist China. Despite the divergence in threat perceptions, military calculations, risk forbearance, and strategic pursuits, the cooperation and assistance among the QSD members are expected to heighten as long as Beijing continues to challenge the existing status quo, rule-based order and liberal governance. Contextualising QSD or Quad, it can be concluded that the Mediterranean Ocean was the Ocean of the long past, the Atlantic Ocean was the Ocean in past, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, well integrated as Indo-Pacific, is the order of the day. So being a littoral country and strong stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific region, India's strategic quest for maritime security through QSD or Quad will well serve the interests of India and other members in the forum, and peace and stability in the region.

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Queer (Diaspora), Identity and Governance: A Theoretical Analysis

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Abstract

The paper tries to provide a conceptual and theoretical understanding of the concepts like, 'Queer', 'Queer Diaspora', 'Queer Identity' and the governance pertaining to queers. The paper examines the migration of queer people, explores the reasons and consequences of their migration to other countries and analyses how queer identity is formed. In Indian Hindu religious traditions, queers are given a very sacred position. But India has been subjected to many kinds of barbaric attacks and rules, who have made all the attempts to wipe out the traces of Indian rich cultural heritage and traditions. The British colonial government of India introduced the Section 377 of Indian Penal Code in 1861, which was repealed very recently with the judgement of Supreme Court of India. The paper also focuses on the role played by civil society organisations, government and legislators in implementing policies to provide human rights to queer people. Overall, the paper makes an attempt to conceptualise queer, queer diaspora and identity so as to analyse the situations and problems faced by queer individuals under social, cultural, political and economical spaces in homeland and different trajectories of their migration to the host land. It has also analysed governance policy perspectives highlighting Indian government policies and it's impact on queer individuals, and how their life can be changed by the positive and needed changes in the policies.

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Keywords: Queer Theory, Sexuality, Homosexuality, Migration, Queer Diaspora, Queer Identity, Homophobia, Governance.

Introduction

Elimination and discrimination have major impacts on the lives of lesbian, gay and transgender individuals. This has resulted in the following: abandonment by home and family, being ignored and isolated in the community, restrictions on mobility, fuelling migration to other areas (such as the city and urban areas) and other countries for seeking safer livelihood and acceptance, withdrawal of family and social support, rejection from religion, attempting suicide, surrendering to parent's decision to marry opposite sex and then later ending up in divorce (Chatterjee, 2014).

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer (LGBTQ) people face several major problems across the world: homophobia of loss, pain and suffering. They face discrimination in schools and in hospitals; they are mostly abused and rejected by their own families. They are beaten, sexually assaulted, tortured and killed (Shahani, 2009). Queer people face terrific difficulties in a society where heterosexuality is often presented as the only acceptable orientation and homosexuality is considered as abnormal. According to Chatterjee (2014) "In the labor market, a majority of LGBT people continue to hide their sexual orientation or tolerate harassment out of fear of losing their job" (p. 321).

Often family is also responsible in marginalizing queer people. They pressurize an individual to marry which only includes heterosexual marriages. In Indian society, marriage plays a vital role in an individual's life. Most of the individuals are forced to marry a person chosen by their parents. And it has always been an issue in queer's life. They are forced to get into a heterosexual marriage.

So, it is significant to critique and analyse the concept of 'queer', and how the society and culture have framed the queer. The paper scrutinises queer diaspora who leave their homeland and

migrate to other countries that give them freedom to express individuals' sexual identity. In the host land, they free themselves from the social and cultural foundations of their homeland. Though they go through nostalgic feelings in the host land, they feel alienated and alone unless they find other queer individuals and communities. Queer identity is formed after going through certain stages including from discovering one's own homosexuality to accepting the homosexuality. After accepting homosexual identity, queer individuals confirm their sexual identity and then try to disclose to their parents, friends and society. They only reveal their sexual orientation to them if they know that they will understand and accept their sexuality. When queer individuals cannot gather strength to disclose their sexuality and feel that the environment of their homeland is suppressing their homosexual identity, then they search for places where they can disclose their sexuality and, in such cases, they migrate to other countries. Civil society organisations, government policies and visual representation of queer people have continuously contributed to bring changes in the Indian society. The annulment of Section 377 of IPC has earned a great sense of trust of LGBTQ people to Indian democracy, judiciary, government and society. Various Indian LGBTQ organisations have demanded to implement some significant policies for the welfare of queer individuals, groups and communities. The Government of India has a very humane and equalitarian policy approach towards the marginalised sections of the society including the LGBTQ community.

Conceptualising the 'Queer'

Queer theory with feminist studies tries to challenge the cultural and heterosexual dominance in the society. It aims to bring out the suppressed voices and talks about the same-sex desires, practices and marriages in the dominant heterosexual world. Queer theory was progressively debated in many fields such as history, social theory, theology, and in the study of cultures. In critical areas it is read under psychoanalysis, deconstruction, feminism and post structuralism (Callis, 2009, p.215).

Feminist theorists brought revolution through their writings to construct their own identity. Curran (2010) states that, "Ultimately a revolutionary group has to break the hold of the dominant group over theory, it has to structure its own connections" (p. 63). They have brought many issues of women in their writings. Their issues were brought under media too to spread more awareness in the society.

Hooks (1984) argues that the meanings and definitions given by patriarchal society should be redefined and transformed. So, queer theory rejects any kind of categorization, it rejects the binary differences among male and female, masculine and feminine, and heterosexual and homosexual.

Since 1950s, researchers such as Kinsey started arguing on the concept of sexuality and claimed that many individuals must have experienced both heterosexual and homosexual feelings and thus, he declared that human sexuality is flexible (Seidman, 1994). Feminist and queer movements, in the early 1970s, started criticizing the tradition of heterosexuality such as marriage and building the name of the family and started questioning specific gender roles. They tried to normalize the concept of homosexuality and identity (Seidman, 1994). Gamson and Moon (2004) argue that the sociologists, after 1970s and 1980s, started studying sexuality as a part of the society and political life. Sociologists started collecting the information from gay and lesbian movements and then developed the theory of sexuality by discussing the impact of sexual discrimination (Gamson and Moon, 2004). Modern sociologists began observing the politics of sexuality through black feminist theories and queer theory that how sexuality interconnects with other forms of suppression and discrimination such as based on gender, race, class, ethnicity, religion, etc. (Gamson & Moon, 2004).

Seidman (1994) argues that modern sociologists have started defining sexuality as a system of knowledge, which has organized the social, political and cultural aspects of the society. Thus, queer theory in the modern world suggests that the pattern of studying

sexuality as a study of minority should be changed as a study of knowledge which will build the society and help in forming equality between heterosexuals and homosexuals (Seidman, 1994).

Queer Diaspora

Queer individuals suffer to 'come out' in the society of the homeland which results in their migration to other countries. Weston (1995) says that coming out in rural areas is a tough task for queer individuals that many of them decide to move out or migrate. She describes their sufferings and difficulties through a song sung by Meg Christian who describes the difficulties of queer individuals who live in rural areas, so, she suggests other queer individuals through her song that if they find difficulty in 'coming out' in the rural areas then they should move to big cities where their sexuality will be accepted, "Her advice to onlookers who had friends or relatives still struggling to 'come out' in the countryside: Tell them to take the next bus or train to a big city" (Weston, 1995, p. 253).

In the early 1970s, Queer individuals who were living in rural areas were not aware of other LGBTQ individuals' existence due to lack of connection and interaction. They always thought that they were the only one who was different from other (heterosexual) people around them. They did not know that they may get to interact with other queer individuals unless they have migrated to urban areas where they all came out through gay and lesbian movements and formed collective identity (Weston, 1995).

Weston (1995) argues that other than migrating to other places and country why queer individuals from rural areas have not chosen to live in the same place and disclose their sexuality? She says that through her research, she found out that some queer individuals from rural areas claim that they have revealed their sexual identity to their close ones which includes friends, relatives, etc. But they all have suggested them to migrate to urban areas of the country (Weston, 1995).

Weston's (1995) research on gay individuals in Toronto brought the similar aspects. In Toronto too, queer individuals were not aware of other queer individuals. Most of the queer people in Toronto have migrated to countries such as U.S. (Weston, 1995).

Andermahr (2011) argues that Anne-Marie Fortier's theory of Queer Diaspora discusses that queer individuals feel attached and connected with their homeland while and after migrating to the foreign countries. And other queer theorists have also pointed out some important features of queer diaspora such as separation, loss, etc. And Alan Sinfield argues that for queer individuals, home does not mean their homeland but the place from where they choose to migrate due to various reasons such as facing discrimination on the basis of gender and sexuality, lack of freedom of expression and the need to come out. Thus, according to Sinfield, home is not the place of origin but it is a destination where queer individuals do arrive but not return (Andermahr, 2011).

Theorists compare the exile of queer diasporas from the exile of Jewish and African diasporas. Theorists such as Watney argues that Jewish and African diasporas have experienced external exile moving from the country of origin to a foreign country, but queer individuals were exiled within the country (Andermahr, 2011). They were, according to postcolonial theorists, excluded and treated as outsiders in their country of origin (Andermahr, 2011).

Andermahr (2011) argues on the basis of Anne-Marie Fortier's theory of queer diasporas that queer individuals choose to migrate or move out of their homeland in order to come out. For queer individuals, their homeland is home for heterosexuals but not for homosexuals. So, to search for home they have to leave their homeland and make a foreign land their own home.

Queer individuals begin to compare homeland and host land on the aspects of social, cultural and political freedom and recognition. They tend to migrate to other countries where they find more opportunities on these grounds. Theorists argue that if queer individuals find the freedom of expression in their host land

then they will choose to mobilise and make the host land their home (Ayoub & Bauman, 2018).

Before migrating to queer-friendly countries, many queer individuals have faced mental abuse, physical assault, sexual abuse, rape, forcefully made to take conversion therapies, forcefully made to engage in heterosexual marriages, and have faced public shame. They faced these situations and problems right from their childhood which have lasted till their migration to other countries. They were not only bullied by unknowns but were also mocked and criticized from their own family members, relatives and friends (Alessi et al., 2018).

Many queer individuals have migrated to other countries as refugees. They find asylum that help them to reach a safe place in the host country. Although many of them have faced problems such as discrimination, bullying from refugees who share different ethnicity, religion and class. Finding a place in the host land is not easy as it sounds. Before settling down in the host land, many queer individuals have to face rejection in getting residences because of their national, religious, and sexual identity (Alessi et al., 2018).

Queer Identity

Troiden (1989) describes identity as representing one's self in the roles of social settings. And it varies from the notion of self-concept. Self-concept is a complete thought of an individual's experience, imagination and belief of one's sexual orientation. He further says that self-concept does not need any references of social settings, but identity needs references of social settings such as labels like teacher as an identity at work, daughter as an identity at home, etc. (Troiden, 1989).

An individual's self-concept includes homosexual identity along with other identities. In this respect, individuals perceive themselves as homosexual in the sexual situation. Hence, Troiden (1989) explains Cass's theory of homosexual identity as it can

perform as a self-identity, a perceived identity, a presented identity or all of them.

If individuals see themselves as homosexual then it is called self-identity. If they find that other people observe them as homosexuals, then it becomes perceived identity. And if they present themselves as homosexuals in social settings, then it becomes presented identity (Troiden, 1989).

One's identity is formed based on how one sees his/her self and how others see it. Thus, there is no fixed identity as seeing ourselves is different from that of the way others see us. This leads to the formation of different identities. Van Meijl (2008) argues that, "Identity referred primarily to a coherent sense of self or the feeling on the part of the individual of being the same as how he or she is viewed and identified by other(s). Thus, identity referred to a well adjusted personality that emerges from the same, or: identical, identification of self by self and other" (p. 169).

Troiden (1989) has developed four-stage models of homosexual identity formation which includes 'sensitization', 'identity confusion', 'identity assumption', and 'commitment' (p. 48). He has developed these stages on the theories of Vivienne Cass, K. Plummer and Barbara Pense (p. 48). In the first stage of identity formation, 'sensitization', individual's experience, homosexual feelings in their childhood. Many lesbians have claimed that they were not interested in boys, they felt different and unfeminine, they were aware of their homosexuality. And gay males have claimed that they did not feel that they were like other boys, and they were also attracted to them (Troiden, 1989).

Only some individuals succeed to realize before age twelve that they are homosexuals. A feeling of being different from same sex people make them to observe their sexual preferences in childhood. The homosexual experiences that individuals experience in social, emotional and genital grounds is examined during adolescence (Troiden, 1989).

Second stage of homosexual identity formation, 'identity confusion' discusses the confusion of individuals as homosexual or heterosexual at the ages of adolescence. Some individuals experience both homosexual and heterosexual feelings at this stage. Some experience only homosexual feelings and could not take heterosexual identity but at this stage they could not develop full awareness of themselves as homosexuals. Thus, they get stuck in the confusion of their sexual identity (Troiden, 1989).

In the third stage of homosexual identity formation, 'identity assumption' individuals first confirm their sexual identity as homosexual. They first accept themselves as homosexual and then they present themselves as homosexual to other people. First, they prefer to come out as homosexual to other homosexual individuals then later to their friends and close ones. If they find their family liberal and flexible in thoughts, then they decide to come out to their family too. In this way the third stage of homosexual identity formation includes self-identity and presented identity (Troiden, 1989).

In the fourth stage of homosexual identity formation, 'commitment' individuals commit to themselves that they are homosexuals by coming into a relationship with same sex individuals. Some individuals bring their relationship to others including family, friends and their relatives,. And some choose to hide their relationship from their closed ones because of homophobia (Troiden, 1989).

Queers struggle to come out of homophobia: homophobia of rejection from the society, rejection from religion, rejection from family etc. Homophobia has its great impact on queer relationship; it affects their life and relationship. According to Closs (2010), queer identifies some impacts of homophobia in their relationship: "negotiating affection in public settings, homophobia's impact on sense of self, lack of familial involvement, and belief that homophobia makes the relationship stronger" (p. 131).

Kaufman and Johnson (2004) also establish their theory of gay and lesbian identity formation on the basis of the stages given by Cass, Coleman, Plummer and Troiden (Kaufman & Johnson, 2004). They argue that in order to understand homosexual identity, it is important to focus on relationships of queer people. Queer individuals find being in a relationship helps them to develop their homosexual identity in the society. And many of them are bound to hide their homosexual relationship in public because being visible to the society as gay or lesbian couples, sometimes or most of the times, bring negative reactions from the society which diminishes their confidence in coming out (Kaufman & Johnson, 2004).

Queer couples who get positive responses from the society in their process of coming out, through the medium of their romantic relationship, develop homosexual identity easily. Whereas, couples who face negative responses from the society finds difficulty in developing homosexual identity (Kaufman & Johnson, 2004).

The main issue of queer individuals is their acceptance by heterosexuals (Kaufman & Johnson, 2004). Queer individuals find heterosexual people's acceptance and opinions important in forming a homosexual identity. To develop and commit to homosexual identity, queer individuals seek positive response from heterosexuals (Kaufman & Johnson, 2004).

Kaufman and Johnson (2004) further argue that some researchers have showed their problem in accepting the traditional stage models of Cass, Plummer, Coleman and Troiden. They argue that researchers such as Rust, Brady, Busse, Parks, Kaminski, Whitman, McDonald and other researchers have argued that the stage models lack flexibility of identity formation, 'coming out' as a life-long process, and also lack elaborating the experiences of queer individuals in different aspects including race, gender, social class, religion, etc. (Kaufman & Johnson, 2004).

Weinberg (1985) argues that homosexual identity should be observed through various fields such as physical and biological

sciences, and psychoanalytic and socio-cultural. He argues that individual's identity varies if we observe from the mentioned streams. He says that biological stages are different from that of sociological stages because biological stages include birth, aging and death, hence, we do not include stages of infancy, childhood, adolescence, young adulthood, middle adulthood and old age. These stages are shown in sociological terms (Weinberg 1985). Weinberg (1985) further argues that one cannot reach to the final stage of identity in social and psychological terms because identity keeps changing in these terms and it does not have an end.

Kaufman and Johnson (2004) argue that during 1970s and 1980s it was important to develop stage models of homosexual identity formation but now it is important to link identity to other theories to expand all types of identity development more elaborately concerning other grounds such as social and psychological (Kaufman & Johnson, 2004). Hence, they explain the relation between 'self and identity' to take the process of identity development to the next level in understanding identity formation. They develop the theory of 'self and identity' by focussing on Burke's identity theory and the concept of 'reflected appraisals' which means the importance of other's (specifically heterosexuals) opinion and acceptance of homosexuality in queer's life (Kaufman & Johnson, 2004, p.811).

According to Burke's identity theory, individuals desire to be perceived by others the same way they perceive themselves. Then they compare the opinion of others about them with the opinion of themselves, which according to Kaufman and Johnson (2004) is 'reflected appraisals' (p. 811 & 812). If individuals find the opinions of others and themselves similar then they continue to maintain the behaviour, and if they find differences in the opinions they try to behave according to the opinion of others while suppressing or hiding their own desires and opinions to others (Kaufman & Johnson, 2004).

Kaufman and Johnson (2004) argue that to what extent queer individuals maintain their behaviour and identity according to the opinions of others. One cannot suppress their homosexual desires for long and let heterosexual identity to prevail (Kaufman & Johnson 2004). In order to show their normalcy in the heterosexual surrounding, queer individuals try to hide their sexuality. In this case, mostly queer individuals choose to migrate to the places where they find the environment which cope with the opinions of homosexual individuals.

Sometimes, queer individuals, in respect to get supported with their homosexual identity, try to develop other identities under the social grounds (Kaufman & Johnson 2004), such as, lesbians becoming a surrogate mother. This enhances the ultimate meaning of a woman, and the process of reproduction and becoming of a mother, eventually fulfils the expectation of the society from a woman.

Repeal of Section 377 of IPC and LGBTQ Rights and Governance in India

Generally, policies include laws, local policies and government plans, resource allocation plans, regulatory measures and funding priorities that are promoted by a governmental body. Before making the policy, policy-makers should think whether these policies will work for human welfare or not. The proposed policy will respect and support individual rights or not. (Barker et al., 2016). Policies should always be made human-centric but not any particular gender-centric. Policies which have been made with particular gender-centric focus have always suppressed other genders. Thus, before making any policy, policy-makers should examine and analyse that it has presented and proposed according to the country's constitution and especially in the welfare and equal rights of an individual irrespective of sexual orientation and gender identity. (Barker et al., 2016).

Before the abolition of Section 377 of Indian Penal Code and decriminalisation of homosexuality, queer people were bound to follow the established social norms and were punished being

found in 'unnatural' sexual relationship. Either they were pushed into heterosexual relationship or exiled from family and society. Indian society follows the established societal and cultural norms, and people are made to believe that religion does not permit any homosexual acts, which was (and has been) the biggest problem for queers.

In Indian religious traditions, queer people are given a very sacred place. In Hindu holy scriptures, there are so many instances where queer people held prominent positions and they were highly revered. Hindu God Lord Shiva's 'Ardhnarishwar' form is a beautiful manifestation of the female in male and male in female, manifesting the rich equalitarian and respectful heritage of India. It is always seen as holy in India for a new born baby to be blessed by queer people. But India has always been a subject of the brutal and diabolic eye of the foreign barbarians due to its rich economic treasures, magnificent and enriched heritage and highly fertile and beautiful land mass. For last some centuries, India was viciously subjugated to Mughal rule and then British rule. The foreign invaders made all attempts to crush the Indian civilizational ethos, bulldoze Indian beliefs and wipe out the rich cultural heritage and practices. In the process, the LGBTQ people also suffered.

In 1861, the British government had introduced the Section 377 of Indian Penal Code (IPC), which made homosexuality a criminal offence, hence making provisions for severe punishment. Section 377 of IPC has given rise to infinite crimes, such as it was misused by several police officers; they deliberately tortured and accused people of committing homosexual acts and demanded from them a huge amount of bribe and were threatened if they denied. Moreover, even after not finding them involved in any sexual acts they forcefully took many LGBTQ people in custody and raped. They were verbally and physically abused by police officers. (Rishishwar, 2016). Boyce (2015) has also explored how Section 377 of Indian Penal Code has raised multiple exploitations of queer individuals that most of the times they were beaten, harassed, and tortured (Boyce, 2015).

Section 377 of IPC had banned 'unnatural offences' but not homosexuality. Unnatural offences can be seen between any couple both homosexual and heterosexual. According to the Section 377 of IPC, actions should have been taken against any person found performing unnatural offences irrespective of sexuality. But it was used in targeting only LGBTQ individuals, groups and communities. The Section had taken away even basic rights from LGBTQ people, which comes under Fundamental Rights of the Indian Constitution, such as Freedom of Speech, Right to Privacy, and Right to Equality etc. This ultimately affected their right to work and they have been tortured in work place or fired from jobs. They were even discriminated, humiliated and abandoned from education and military sectors (Rishishwar, 2016).

LGBTQ issues, especially the Section 377 of IPC came into its consideration after many protests and coming out of LGBTQ individuals, groups, and communities, many heterosexual people also joined the protests to provide them rights to live as human beings under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of Indian Constitution. Conferences, seminars and documentaries on LGBT people and their rights continued to spread in various cities of India including Delhi, Mumbai, and Kolkata etc. (Mukesh, 2017). According to these Articles, an individual, irrespective of sexual orientation and gender identity, have Right to Equality, h/she cannot be discriminated on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, and have the Right to Privacy. In August 2016, the Supreme Court of India reviewed the criminalisation of homosexual activity. In August 2017, the Supreme Court of India started looking on the issues and discrimination of LGBTQ people under these Articles. And on 6th September 2018, the Supreme Court of India decriminalised Section 377 of IPC (Das, 2018).

UNO has always taken stand in favour of LGBTQ rights. In 2008, a resolution supporting LGBTQ rights was first introduced at UN General Assembly by French/Dutch representatives, which included strong disapproval of harassment, violence,

discrimination and prejudice based on gender identity and sexual orientation (Das, 2018).

LGBTQ individual and community are happy with the positive changes regarding their rights. But transgender people do not think that they got total justice with their identity. Recently, on 1st December 2019, transgender Bharatanatyam dancer named A. Revathi from Tamil Nadu claimed herself as Thirunangai. She is first transwoman who claims her identity as Thirunangai – a respectable, dignified term. She expresses her agony that the term 'Thirunangai' is replaced with 'third gender'. She wishes to identify herself as a woman. She says that the identity 'third gender' raises many questions such as who are categorised as first gender? If it is men, are they superior to women? Does it imply that transgenders are inferior to women? On what basis is humankind discriminated as such? (Muralidharan, 2019, pp. 16).

Rishishwar (2016) argues that LGBTQ rights are human rights and human rights should protect the individual from discrimination, violence and threatening (Rishishwar, 2016). Discrimination in various sectors have produced difficulties in the lives of queer people such as discrimination in education and job sectors that took them forcefully on the paths of begging and prostitution.

Countries which support LGBTQ rights believe that education sector helps to bring public awareness. The Ministry of Education started supporting the programmes that address homophobia and rights of LGBTQ people in schools, colleges and universities and in the society. Prime Ministers and Presidents of many countries have supported LGBTQ rights through their speeches. They asked societies to give prime importance to the ability and creativity of people irrespective of their sexual orientation and gender identity (Brooks & Daly, 2016).

Connolly (2012) makes her argument that in order to stop LGBTQ bullying in education sector, Local Board of Education should adopt a policy which will prohibit bullying of LGBTQ students and should ask every school, college and university to include the given policy on their websites. This step will ultimately stop

bullying LGBTQ students and will result in ending suicides (Connolly, 2012).

Reynolds (2013) argues that LGBTQ legislators make a great impact on changing policies and forming new policies in the welfare of LGBTQ rights. Further, he makes his argument that LGBTQ MPs who work in national parliaments influence their straight colleagues and make it easier to be accepted by them. And studies have shown that heterosexuals have given their support to gay rights after working with latter. He presents a table of LGBTQ Members of Parliament around the world from 1976-2011. Twenty seven countries have elected 151 LGBTQ MPs to the National Assembly from 1976-2011. (Reynolds, 2013).

Marginalised people can make and upgrade policies regarding LGBTQ rights or marginal people's rights as they can better understand the problems faced by marginalised communities. Their presence in legislatures can make a greater change and make marginalised people-friendly policies. Increasing more LGBTQ legislators will increase the chances of introducing or bringing more LGBTQ-friendly laws. Three openly gay individuals have become Prime Minister respectively in 2002, 2009 and 2011. Per-Kristian Foss became acting Prime Minister of Norway in 2002, Johanna Siguroardottir has become Prime Minister in Iceland in 2009, and Elio Di Rupo of Belgium in 2011. (Reynolds, 2013).

Legislators were made to make anti-bullying bills into law because of increased number of suicides of LGBTQ children and youth. The cases of bullying LGBTQ students in schools, colleges and universities arose since late 1960s and early 1970s. The first suicide case came from Europe. And gradually the data of suicides and suicidal attempts came from many countries. (Connolly, 2012).

Indian government follows a very non-partisan and equalitarian approach in framing policies. Apart from many initiatives for the LGBTQ people, the present Government of India has passed The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, which

provides for protection of rights of transgender persons and their welfare; and it states that no person or establishment shall discriminate against a transgender person. Transgender persons should be given equal and fair treatment and opportunity in educational establishments and services; employment or occupation; healthcare services; access to, or provision or enjoyment or use of any goods, accommodation, service, facility, benefit, privilege or opportunity dedicated to the use of the general public or customarily available to the public; Right of Movement; Right to Reside, purchase, rent, or otherwise occupy any property; stand for or hold public or private office etc. Most importantly, the Act states that a person recognised as transgender shall have a Right to self-perceived gender identity (Ministry of Law and Justice, 2019).

Government of India has constituted a National Council for Transgender Persons under The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 to advise the Central Government on the formulation of policies, programmes, legislation and projects with respect to transgender persons; to monitor and evaluate the impact of policies and programmes; to review and coordinate the activities of all the departments of Government and other Governmental and non-Governmental Organisations which are dealing with matters relating to transgender persons; to redress the grievances of transgender persons etc. (Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment, 2020). The other members of the Council include representatives of various Ministries/ Departments, five representatives of transgender community, representatives of NHRC and NCW, representatives of State Governments and UTs and experts representing NGOs (Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment, 2020). Government of India's initiatives to give the LGBTQ people equal rights and self-respect as human beings are really noteworthy.

Indian (Queer) Diaspora's Fight for LGBTQ Issues

Along with many civil society organisations, human rights groups, and queer rights movements which were supported by individuals

vastly around the country and globe; queer and South Asian queer diasporic individuals, groups and communities have also made their contribution and stood against Section 377 of IPC. The annulment of Section 377 of IPC has brought self-respect, cheers and confidence among the queer people in diaspora. Queer diaspora has also contributed to the fight against the repeal of the Section 377 of IPC. Atluri (2010) states that Section 377 of IPC was enforced by British Colonial rule which was abrogated by the Supreme Court of India. South Asian Queer Diasporas showed their support and joy at digital platform especially through twitter and facebook when Supreme Court's decision of repealing Section 377 of IPC was declared. Some of them even wrote that it is the time for decolonisation which meant that it was very important to abolish law that was imposed by British Government against the human rights. (Atluri, 2010).

Nanditha (2020) asserts that digital locales have given opportunities to individuals to share their thoughts and expressions, that they can easily and quickly convey their messages in the society (Nandith, 2020). Queer, non-queer, and South Asian queer diasporas have come together in the digital spaces to stand against criminalisation of homosexuality. Twitter has been used largely to show the strength and voice of the queer diasporic community (Nanditha, 2020).

Bose (2017) highlights some of the prominent South Asian diasporic writers who have battled against criminalisation of homosexuality through their writings. Writers such as Suniti Namjoshi who moved from India to Canada has brought lesbian issues in her writings, Shyam Selvaduari who has migrated from Sri Lanka to Canada has portrayed his life in one of his writings *Funny Boy* (1994). There are also other Indian diasporic writers such as Firdaus Kanga, Vikram Seth, etc. who have constantly contributed in the field of literature to spread their voice and thoughts against the criminalisation of homosexuality (Bose, 2017). Not only South Asian diasporic writers but South Asian diasporic directors such as Nisha Ganatra, Ian Iqbal Rashid have also highlighted discrimination and violence against homosexuals.

Role of Civil Society, Films and Literature in Creating Awareness about LGBTQ Issues

Brooks and Daly (2016) say that civil society plays a vital role in helping and supporting government to form policies in human welfare. The judiciary ensures that civil society groups have Right to Assemble. The support of civil society organisations and action of governments can help in changing policies in the welfare of LGBTQ people. In order to make positive changes in policies for LGBTQ rights, government should consult with LGBTQ activists, organisations and communities. Government is an important driver of policy making. To bring positive changes, it is important to consult local LGBTQ activists, organisations and communities to do preferable and needed changes in policies. (Brooks & Daly, 2016).

Literature plays an important role in the society. It helps the society to change the rigid thoughts and accept the alternative realities. It portrays the hidden and suppressed realities of the society and this way it helps to focus on the issues of marginalised individuals, groups and communities of the society. There are some writers in the diaspora, as has been mentioned above, have been portraying queer issues in their writings.

To bring awareness about queer individuals' difficulties and rights in the society, it is important to represent queers through films and in other visual elements such as TV series. It will make people understand and accept queer individuals in the society equal to heterosexuals. Similarly, it is also important that queer directors should come out to the society and represent themselves in the films as queer directors that can help in representing the issue better.

Haworth says that queer directors should come forward to represent themselves in films. As non-queer directors do not observe things closely as a queer director can observe. "I really want to encourage others to get out there and tell their own stories, instead of letting the "professional" filmmaker do it for

them. We need more first-person stories made by people from within their communities” (Haworth, 2008).

There is a huge difference between reading a novel and watching a film. Film reduces the complexity to understand the context comparing to novel. Visualizing the same thing which is written in the novel brings difference in our understanding of a particular context. Weedon (2009) describes the same by giving example of South Asian films and audiences, and South Asian texts and readers. He states:

The visual is central to the cultural politics of representation. Whereas written texts may engage the non-South Asian reader using techniques promoting empathy or enabling the reader to ‘see’ the world through South Asian eyes, it cannot insist on an engagement with characters as visibly other. Reading novels and watching film versions of them are very different experiences. While films inevitably tend to reduce the degree of complexity that is found in novels (Weedon, 2009, p. 118).

Conclusion

LGBTQ people have been oppressed, humiliated and rejected from the family, relatives and society. Hence to escape the rigid society, many queer individuals have migrated to other countries which have queer-friendly environment. They have fought against the social and cultural taboos of the society and come out of the closet. We find many queer individuals who, because of homophobia of losing family, relations, and respect in the society, decide to stay in the closet and pretend to be a heterosexual. A conceptual and theoretical analysis of the queer, queer diaspora and identity provides us a better framework to analyse their predicament in the society at large, and also helps in framing policies of governance for LGBTQ people.

The annulment of the Section 377 of Indian Penal Code by the Supreme Court of India has provided the dignity and self-respect for the LGBTQ people. Efforts have been made to spread

awareness regarding queer people and their rights. Constantly, various civil society organisations have been trying to make Indian society understand the queer people and their sensibilities through different mediums especially through literature and films.

Policies should be made and implemented in the welfare of queer people in India. Policies should be made to protect them in education, job and in various other sectors. Anti-bullying policies should be introduced in order to protect them in schools, colleges, universities and job sectors. And they should be allowed to decide their own identity. The present Government of India's legislation, The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 and constitution of National Council for Transgender Persons have been quite remarkable steps in providing LGBTQ people equal rights, opportunities and prospects in all the spheres of the society. These developments in India have been very well received and appreciated by the (Indian) queer diaspora. Like any other segment of Indian diaspora, queer diaspora is also contributing to India's all-round development and they are also India's soft power promoting India in the world. These recent developments, legislations and initiatives have brought the queer diaspora closer to their homeland India.

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Character Education through Religious Values: An Analysis

Sushil Kumar Tiwari*

Abstract

Religion plays a major role in character education that is synonymously used with character building and character development. The application of religious values in education is the prerequisite of desired characters in society. Many of us firmly believe that religion provides proper ways of living. Ignoring religious values; society may face many challenges, like increased rate of crimes, selfishness, cheating etc. This paper focuses on the linkage of religion with character, out of the various factors of character that were discussed in the interviews with 25 experts in the field of character education. Interviews were conducted to explore the religious sources of character and the discourse has been developed employing thematic analysis of the interviews.

Interview analysis was the part of qualitative phase of a mixed method study and ground level data emerged through the semi structured interviews in abundance. 'Coding- decoding method' was applied under 'thematic analysis' to identify subthemes from the data. Paper includes some of the responses in each of the subtheme to substantiate the particular subtheme.

Keywords: Religion, character education, character building, character development, religious values.

Introduction

Ignoring religious values, society may face many challenges, like increased rate of crimes, selfishness, cheating etc. For the country like India where secularism is one of the constitutional values, some argues that the constitution does not allow giving importance to religion and religious values in society. Moreover,

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education should not include the religion or religious values. It is a ruthless argument to put away the society from religious roots; an easily available treatment of severe disease of characterlessness. Even the University Education Commission of 1948-49 (University Education Commission, 1962) discusses this contradiction and critically remarks that being secular doesn't mean to be religious illiterate. Incorporating religion in education for development of character or character education for the betterment of society is not against secularism. It is application of 'goodness' of all religions in society instead of embedding to follow just one religion, which should be appreciated. India is birthplace of at least four religions Hinduism, Sikhism, Jainism and Buddhism (although birthplace i.e. Lumbini of Lord Buddha is in Nepal, at present, but it was part of India that time and also Siddhartha got the enlightenment and became Lord Buddha, in the place i.e. Bodh Gaya, Bihar; in India) and also of the numerous faiths and believes. Other religions like Islam and Christianity also co-exist in the subcontinent.

Jhingran (1982, p.1) clarifies the need of religious comparison by saying, "In the nineteenth century there was a great urge to seek for some universal essence of all religions. The impetus for this approach came from Max Mueller who presented to the West the wealth and depth of religio-philosophic insights of the East."

Character is the Assimilation of commitment of virtues, throughout the world literature made by great protagonists of philosophy it has been found that character has been defined as the integrity of any individual of a group or of a society towards committing to follow the well concluded norms, morals, morality and ethics. Character in terms of human being is always supposed to be practice of such things or virtues which facilitates living of an individual without disturbing the survival of others, the term others include plant kind and other animal kind also.

Significance of religion as a source of character

India is believed to be the country of religious people. For majority of Indians, their daily life is mostly driven by the deep-

rooted traditions and practices of their religion. "India has been ranked the 18th most religious country in the world with over 81 percent citizens claiming to have religious sentiments, according to a latest survey. The polls result released by the Win-Gallup International Religiosity and Atheism Index showed that only 13 percent Indians considered themselves as "not religious" while 3 percent claimed themselves as "convinced atheists" (The Indian Express, 2012). Many people in India follow the religion in their everyday doings.

Indian education is successful in teaching for profit making, but it lacks in inculcating values. Education has failed to serve its main purpose of making good citizens. After education, one is involved in bribery, cheating etc. then how could we say that it is successful? At present, we have a trend that more educated means more money maker. So, education system is failed in relation to character building. Religion is more relevant to inculcate desired values.

Durkheim (1956) rightly pointed out that "religion is a social institution" (p. 77). Comparing religion with science Durkheim reiterates that "before the sciences were established, religion filled the same office; for every mythology consists of a conception, already well elaborated, of man and of universe. Science, moreover, was the heir of religion." This explanation reveals the impact of religion in social interactions and obligations. Still it affects many people around the world in character building. Discussing character through social capital and cultural life without the role of religion is not possible, especially when character is being discussed in Indian context.

Religion actually appreciates and carries the elements of character building in true sense. Western world has persuaded the whole world that the religion should be delimited to pray, to worship etc. and it should not interfere in other affairs. But if the religion is beneficial then why ignoring this and not opting to make the world better? Religion entails to understand that what type of relationship should be build up with other people.

In Indian context religion is different from its superficial meaning. Etymologically religion has come out from a Latin word 'religare' which means 'to tie' or 'to bind'. It can be seen as the power to bind the people together in a particular system of belief. But it eventually unattached system from individual and religion as a power is somehow an outer force to bind. On the other hand, 'Dharma' is '*Dharayati Iti Dharma*' which means something that is attached and indispensable part of individual. It is the bigger perspective to see that each and every deed is being counted. One of the senses is duty but again narrower than the '*Dharma*.' So, to explore the character in true sense in Indian context the elements or subthemes of character had to be linked with the experts of 'Dharma' with the pervasive view of sources of character.

Instances from the data

The responses of the religious experts from all religion were taken through the semi-structured interview. The obtained data were qualitatively analyzed through the coding-decoding method under thematic analysis approach. The opinion in the interview ranges from the most scientific to the most dogmatic view regarding character education. One or two unique and opposite views were also recorded. On the basis of the responses following subthemes of character have emerged from the data. Every subtheme is substantiated by the relevant responses of the respondents that are linked with the particular subthemes:

1. Foundation Stone of Identity

X: Character makes who you are. You tried to be a man of few characters and for that you follow your roots and follow your hearts. If you find that you will be fine.

Y: Character is that who makes identity of a man. Human identity is not his 'individual self' but it is his personality (i.e. integrated including social behavior). Personality carries the special personal identity itself which is not external, but in today's circumstances the reality is that only individual self is given

importance. It is thyself, how he looks like, how he presents himself, how his behavior is, and all these are his individual self, which is superficial. But this cannot be human's character.

2. Expressing Views on the Roles and Responsibilities in Family, School, Nation & World

X: The teacher should be trained enough to make the students aware that always keep nation first. The problems and solution along with the opportunities of community and country should also be discussed.

Y: Everybody believes just to go behind crowd. Education plays a great role in this what to follow and what is not right. Something may be good for Rome and their culture, but people following blindly in Delhi needs proper education.

3. Wisdom to Consider the Positive or Multiple Perspectives

X: Even an organism can become God by the qualities of *samyak-darshhan*, *samyak-gyan* and *samyak-charitra*.

Y: In Guruvani, it has been stated as, '*Khatari, Brahmin, Shudra, Vaishya, Desh chahun varnon ka sanjha*' means, the religion is for all. Even, it is open for all different religions. Like, as our respected Guru approved and stated that an individual following his religion according to his faith praying five times a day is true religious. A true *Brahman* is that, who is theologian (*Brahmgyani*). Similarly, a true Sikh is that who has the knowledge of pious *Gurugranthsahib*. Thus, it does not condemn any religion and reiterates that if you have any shortcomings just throw them away to be a perfect individual.

4. To Hold Forever and Not to Lose the Basic Human Tendencies

X: 'Vritt' is the Sanskrit word for charitra. It has been said in Sanskrit language,

*"Vrittam Yatnen Sanrakshyet, Vittam Aayaati Yaati Cha
Aksheedo Vittatah Ksheedo Vrittastu Hato Hata:!!"*

It means, “One should always try to preserve his character because money comes and goes, but if character goes for once.... even if the person has money, he gets destroyed soon.” Thus, comparing character with money, people are running for money, but money comes and goes but, there is character which remains stable. Character is ‘*Shudha Acharan*’ (good conduct).

Y: If something is good it is good for all and no question at all for taking it as bad. Virtue is there in goodness. The elements are love, emotions, goodwill, divinity, eminence etc. One saying is there in Sanskrit, “*Gyanam Shrutva Shradhya*,” means knowledge is relevant only if it is being listen with dedication. It may not be aroused. Thus, character is subject to behavior and unaffected by miserable conditions.

5. Considering Own Life Valuable

X: The teacher should give the examples of great lives. They should be made strong by using the role models and ideals of struggle. It has been said, “*Jeevan Naro, Bhadrah Shatani Pashyet*’ It means if life will continue, you will be able to see thousands of new things.

Y: Everybody is a part of the providence. Nobody teach us that how life is valuable. If these things will come in education, students won’t commit suicide.

6. Desirable Behaviours Expressed in Daily Life

X: The child ingrained with true religion can follow any religion. The ingrained religion means the true religious values; like patience, forgiveness, repression (control over mind, psyche and senses; also to detach them from matter) and *Asteya* (not to take anything if not properly given), *Shauch* (purity and may be taken as a form of yoga to remove both internal and external impurities), *Indriya-Nigrah* (chastity), wisdom, knowledge, truthfulness, not to feel resentment, etc. (Manusmriti) are the elements of religious character. Which religion will deny that honesty should be prevailed all over?

The true religion never counts head because it is quite internal. It is the external religion and effected from politics which claims for the number of followers.

- Y: Character is a very big quality that implies human's perception towards world realities. Everything has two sides. How he approaches to the particular thing depends on his character. His perception should be holistic. The individual, who is able to think holistically and rationally, perceive holistically and rationally, attracted towards the holistic element of reality, this ability culminates the character of that individual. This can be tested for any example. Holistic or rationale view is the sole criterion for the character elements of an individual. Do his perceptions towards anything recognize the universal betterment and welfare? This is the only bench mark of character element in human's personality.
7. Initiating and Actively Taking the Steps to Neutralize Misconduct
- X: If somebody develops some good and some bad then he is of mixed character. So many thoughts come in our mind. A terrorist has also such thoughts in time. To which thought we are going to lay out depends on our own habit. Previously, what you have done. Conflicting thoughts may be there, but it is the discretion of particular person that he follows what he is. Thus, showing consistent behavior in similar situations depends on the character trait he has formed on previous experiences. Now, we are not animals. Animality is for certain types of behavior and there is rationality about certain behaviours. Now, it is the human being who can change his very traits from animality to rationality.
- Y: Two things are there Period and Person. It has been said what is the cause of a particular period? As the period flows everyone is drained out with that. But in our pious scriptures it has been said that '*Raja Kalasya Karanam.*' It means king is the cause of that period. Hence, a good king can change the period. Similarly, you are the king of yourself. A family head is

the king of family. Thus a king can change the *Kalyug* (iron age) to *Satyug* (Golden age). If all are ready to fight for profit making and to put others down then the period will become a big challenge, but if you are capable enough with that strength of character that can reverse the challenges into opportunities.

8. Controlled Behaviour

X: The first thing is to control over thought and then it comes in behavior. Education should not be collecting of facts but it should be concentration of mind. We should try to focus on mastering our minds and to gain power of detachment. Sticking to particular things so much then it would be dangerous. Hence, all should try to sit together in school and pray for good things. Then try to look at some good image for developing concentration for good thoughts in mind.

Y: The persons who have the complete *self-control*, are guided to possess five great vows (*panch mahavrata*), these are non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, chastity and non-attachment. Now, one can say that character itself is religion.

9. Theism (Believing on Consequence as Destiny)

X: There is a tough competition all over. A sort of storm is there and everybody is flying in that. Our heritage and God have given the strong foothold to ground firmly. But we are also trying to flee away and rooting up our feet. It is not the wisdom. Think yourself and follow what is genuine and appropriate. It is for the students and also for the guardians and subsistence depends on the almighty. Why are we becoming follower, although we have such strong roots?

Y: If you are doing any unfair activity and believing that I am safe because nobody is watching then certainly you are unaware of the religious fact that the almighty is watching everything all the time. Some others are, like, your all doings of life will be counted after this life and you will be punished on your

misconduct. If one is helping poor then that also, is being recorded. These things are the manifestation of religion.”

10. Spirituality through Self-Analysis

- X: Another thing is spirituality through self-analysis where you should try to think for those who are waiting for your service. Being spiritual means to be ready for help a needy. Students should develop hard work tendency for all such goodness. Thoughts of great men and inspirational ideals should also be the part of classroom. Self-analysis also gives the feedback for the whole day deeds. If a person analyzing daily, he can reduce his mistakes and can move towards the what is right leaving aggressive or disgraceful behaviour. It should be both for learner and teacher.
- Y: Swami ji told that we should try to work on education for character input. Actually, we should try to train some personnel as devotee and follower of character traits which we want to put among students. The major issue is that a teacher says something to students but do some other things in life. For example, one parent complained that their two children are in a very reputed school of the city. One of the children has been given very poor marks in the internal assessment because school management has some issues with his brother of some other class.

11. Valuing Other Faiths and Believes

- X: Somebody claims that religious people fight with each other but it is not true. ‘My religion is good and not yours’ saying so is bad and not proper. Hence, the true religious people are there and we should identify them. Yes, there are many religions. Here I would say that the role of value inculcation should be given to all religions. The righteous act leads to the sense of satisfaction. Religion had such qualities that should be given prime importance. There are so many things in the world and religion tells you about the proper use of that. For example, if God has given you hand then would you use either

to slap somebody or to *Pranaam* or to help someone. This fact is quite relevant in 21st century too.

Y: Good conduct is the soul of every religion. That's why no one should kill another. It is just like killing all humanity and saving someone is like saving all humanity. All the religions teach you the righteous act. Now, if *Madarsas* are teaching only one religion then it's not enough. The other religions should be included and there should be opportunity for the children of other faith to study their religion.

12. Believing in Equality

X: '*Sabme Jot Jot Hai Soyi, Tisde Chanan Sabme Chanan Hoi*'.....
"It is the same spirit that pervaded all. It is his light which illuminates every being." The seeds of spiritual democracy are being reflected in *Guruvani* quoted here.

Y: To think about others pain and sufferings, living a virtuous life not hurting anybody, behaving men or women, other than in own family, as brothers or sisters respectively etc. are the moral principles for the householders. Value signifies the importance. Give importance to all beings and never underestimate anyone as inferior. Indiscrimination should not be there and believing as I am so you are.

13. Austerity for Self but Generosity for Others

X: If you are going to execute behaviours for others comfort at the cost of your own interest then you are special or divine. It is our innate human nature that we are heading towards divinity.

Y: We need to follow renunciation, non violence, celibacy, truthfulness, etc. to the maximum possible extent. Any animal may be speechless but they are not lifeless and limbless.....*Tatvarth Sutra* is the Jain scripture and in the fifth chapter of this it has been said that "*Parasparotu Kaho Jeevanam*" means to be kind to all organisms and to think for the welfare of all.

14. Believing Self as a Part of Almighty

- X: One unique feature of Jainism is to celebrate death. They never take it as bad which results into extreme painful event. They never feel sad for the people who leaves body. They celebrate the death.
- Y: If we lack religion only then, we shall go for profit making by unfair means and vested interest. If we believe that as I am a part of the providence, so the other is; then we shall definitely think before cheating another.

Thus, Conventionally Indian system was characterized with such ethos of natural cultural sharing and strong influences of religion for character building. The society was value driven believing that values are absolute and developing character was a religious task. Character may also be linked to the spiritualism not guided by a religion however, for many people religion is the ground where the spiritual nature develops. Andrei (2010) explained the relationship as, "In a nutshell, spirituality pulsates with issues of inner beliefs and feelings, and is closely associated with religion and philosophy." Tagore, (1923) has clarified the relationship of man, love and spirit by saying, "essentially man is not a slave either of himself or of the world; but he is a lover. His freedom and fulfilment is in love, which is additional name for perfect comprehension." Gandhi ji has the same view; according to Prabhu, & Rao, (1967) he reiterated regarding the need of spiritualism against the hatred as, "when the mind is completely filled with His spirit, one cannot harbour ill-will or hatred towards anyone and, reciprocally, the enemy will shed his enmity and become a friend." Gandhi (reprinted by Desai 1993, p. 177) in his autobiography reiterates that "to develop spirit is to build character." He further explains about the development of spirit that it is to enable one about the knowledge of God and self-realization.

Conclusion

Character is incorporation of the moral values in life, through which one gets benefitted on experience and practice. Character exists with the existence of humans itself. The value is naturally attached with the religion and society. If we withdraw religion from our society then the whole society will be collapsed. Our own traditional spiritual model of giving sense and priority to character was maintained in ancient Gurukul system. But in present scenario nobody and even the great educationists and educational administration can claim that the most important, all-time favorite, ultimate and desirable goal of character development is being achieved through formal system of education in India. Ignoring religious path that can enlighten to achieve this goal is just like avoiding the best medicine to treat a prolonged social disease of characterlessness. Even after sacrificing one's own life so to maintain the sanctity of individual and social life, one should not educate the religious rituals only although these are effective in educating the ethics. But that should simultaneously update the 21st century learner by elaborating the spirituality ingrained in religious practices and rituals. Then the rituals will help to develop the culture of morality. One should elaborate or enlighten the path for the basic internal purposes of these rituals which lead to character building or practice of morality or value inculcation.

Moreover, 'how to incorporate the desired religious and cultural values even in science classrooms' was envisaged by the researcher to solve this problem of incorporating eternal values in formal education. A '*Culturally Sensitive Model*' was suggested and presented in the 'National Seminar on Science Education' (NSSE) held on 22nd November, 2017 at Regional Institute of Education (RIE), Ajmer (National Council of Educational Research and Training-NCERT). That paper was based on the suggested model of researcher and was published in the proceeding entitled as 'Science Education'. National Education Policy 2020 (NEP-2020) seems to be the best vision document and may be the harbinger to the character development. But on the ground of the ideal,

philosophical and theoretical vision of NEP the models that are incorporating religious and cultural resources; like '*culturally sensitive model*'; can only serve as one of the best mediums to realize the ultimate goal of character development at ground level through formal educational system.

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*Article is based on primary data obtained through interviews of 25 experts from the field of religion and character education. Interviews were conducted in India in the year 2015 - 2016.

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The Struggle for Democracy in Pakistan

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Abstract

Ever since it came into existence in 1947, Pakistan is struggling to establish a viable political system. Democracy and democratic institutions have yet to take roots. Its polity has been battered by long spells of military rules and even longer spells of religious, ethnic and economic turmoil. An analysis of the political processes and the underlying socio-economic dynamics along with the bearings of regional and international factors, from 1947 to 1953 suggests that while the state was being constructed, the institutional balance of power shifted in favour of the bureaucracy and the military. During the post-military regimes, the democratic experiences provide an insight into the patterns of conflict that led the military elite to the restoration of a military-hegemonic system. Much of Pakistan's dysfunction is attributed to the disproportionate focus on ideology, military capability, non-state actors and external alliances. Pakistan requires reimagining and reconceptualization as an inclusive, pluralist democratic modern Muslim state.

Keywords: Institutional balance, military rule, civil-military imbalance, colonial state, feudal elites, post-military regime, reimagining

Introduction

Pakistan, as a post-colonial state, has a chequered history with few interludes of democratic rule for more than seventy years of its existence. Historically, Pakistan was envisioned by Quaid-i-Azam (the great leader) Mohammad Ali Jinnah as parliamentary democracy with federal structure. However, democracy could not

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strike roots in the country, manifesting an exceptional case of democratic instability and breakdown. Parliamentary democracy collapsed four times primarily on account of disproportionate development of institutional matrix and the political ambition of the 'man on the horseback'.

Democracy, the system ostensibly given by the various constitutions of Pakistan (1956, 1962, and 1973) was never allowed to function effectively and flourish. Since 1958, time and again, democracy has been strangled by the periodic and long spells of military rule. The right to freedom, political activities, and civil liberties have been denied and the constitution trampled under military boots.

The military has repeatedly intervened in October 1958, March 1969, July 1977, and October 1999 to arrest the development of democracy in the country. For nearly half of its existence (32 years), Pakistan has been under direct military rule or a military-dominated government. Even during the remaining period, the army enjoyed significant influence in Pakistan. Repeated military coups have hampered 'Pakistan's civilian institutional capacity undermined growth of representative institutions and fomented deep divisions in the country' (Shah, 2011, p.70).

Pakistan's Flirtations with Democracy

Pakistan's political history unveils a long drawn-out battle between authoritarianism and democracy. Despite some limited and tentative experiment with democracy from 1947 onwards, Pakistan repeatedly found it immensely difficult to create and sustain democratic institutions. 'Indeed it quickly became a garrison state where the ultimate power rested with the military as the most powerful political and social institution, with many privileges and risks that come with such a status' (Paul, 2014, p. 70). 'Seventy years after its birth', notes Husain Haqqani Pakistan remains 'a semi-authoritarian and volatile semi-autonomous, national security state, which has failed to run itself consistently under constitutional order or rule of law' (Haqqani, 2018, pp.13-14).

The democratic instability and breakdown have been interpreted mainly in terms of 'civilian-military imbalance', 'security state', 'garrison state' and 'overdeveloped state' syndrome/propositions. Pakistan's first democratic experience (1947-1958) was characterized by the trappings of parliamentary government, but throughout this period the soul of democracy had long been smothered in the absence of general elections and lack of interest aggregation and participation through elections and political parties as the vehicle for mobilization. Effective power was, throughout, firmly in the hands of a bureaucratic-military oligarchy, notwithstanding successive changes in the form of government and installation of political parties and political leaders in apparent change of the state apparatus.

In this context, Atizaz Ahsan aptly remarks: "Pakistan had retained the structure of the colonial state from its inception. Lacking an indigenous bourgeoisie, dominated by a feudal elite totally dependent upon the colonial bureaucracy, deprived of well-structured, programme-oriented and duly encadred political parties, and without a judiciary which would jealously protect civil authority and citizen's rights, Pakistan saw a general chocking of the democratic spirit from its early days. First, the civil and military bureaucracy and then the fundamentalists filled the vacuum" (Ahsan, 2005, p.141).

The All India Muslim League (ML), which took credit for the creation of Pakistan, was unable to transform itself from a nationalist movement into national party with grass roots organizations that could led the nation on the path of democracy, constitutionalism, and planned economic development. The ML was not comparable in organizational terms to the Congress Party of India, as it failed to perform the twin task of interest articulation and aggregation and has played a pre-dominant role in the politics of India for decades. The analysis of the origin, organizational and support base of the ML the pre- and post-independence eras reveal that these factors had immensely impacted Pakistan's democratic experiences, including the accommodation of ethno-nationalist identity demands.

In October 1958, apprehensive of emergence of new political forces challenging the power of military bureaucratic axis, on the eve of country's first-ever general election the military demolished the constitutional order and established 'preventive autocracy' (Newman, 1959). Within eleven years of Pakistan's creation, the military effectively interrupted the process of democratic evolution, however tenuous and flawed it was.

After the long spells of military rule under Ayub Khan (1958-69) and Yahya Khan (1969-71), Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's advent to power in December 1971 seems to have ushered in an era of historic significance, for not only was it the first elected civilian government but also the longest to remain in power (1971-1977) in Pakistan. The military's low prestige in the wake of fiasco of 1971 created an opportunity to depoliticize the officers' corps. To bring the military under civilian control, Bhutto adopted several measures, such as, imposing constitutional constraints on the political role of the military, instituting changes in the military command structure and the creation of a para-military force—Federal Security Force. The function of the military had clearly been laid down in the constitution for the first time to put an end to the military's involvement in the politics. But these civilian constraints proved insufficient to tame the generals. The post-military regime of Bhutto provides an insight into the patterns of conflict that led the military elite to the restore of a military-hegemonic system.

The third spell of democracy came after General Zia's demise in 1988. The eleven years of democracy (1988-1999) were not without roadblocks and pitfalls. During this period a crisis of governability had emerged as a concomitant of the democratic process because the 'troika system' of power sharing blended the authoritarian tradition with democracy. The military continued to be the strongest political force that could veto Pakistan's transition to democracy. It is pertinent to note that the democratic regimes of both Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had lived under the shadow of military. In the 'troika system' of power sharing comprising the president, the prime minister, and the

army, the army reserved the veto power. Benazir Bhutto (1990 and 1996) and Nawaz Sharif (1993) governments respectively became causality of the Eighth Amendment.

Pakistan has made its latest revival of democracy for the fourth time in 2008 when the military disengaged itself from the governance once again after the eight years of General Pervez Musharraf's authoritarian rule (1999-2007). The contemporary post-Musharraf democratic transition from 2008 onwards reveals some incremental progress in terms of an elected civilian government completing full five-year terms (2008-2013), and (2013-2018), power being peacefully transferred from one political party to another. In 2013, Pakistan broke its curse of zero democratic turnovers (Shah, 2016, p. 23). All its previous democratic transitions had been aborted by military coups. However, the contemporary democratic experiment is labelled as 'hybrid democracy' because the civilian government is in charge but not given full control of the 'key levels of state power'.

Emergence of the Pakistani state

The creation of Pakistan was the result of a political and ideological movement that began as an idea in 1930s and became forceful with the passage of Lahore Resolution in 1940, which presented the two-nation theory and in 1947 Pakistan came into being. Partition of India and emergence of Pakistan in 1947 was an unparalleled instance in world history, as idea of Pakistan became a reality in a relatively short span of time. "The political movement for Pakistan lasted a mere seven years – for a whole variety of reasons – acquired a state of its own in 1947. Few nations in the world had such a short gestation period" (Varshney 2008-09, p. 10).

Interestingly, the demand for Pakistan evolved primarily among Muslim minority areas of British India i.e., the United Provinces of Awadh and Agra (presently Indian state of Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand) and Bihar. The Muslim elite of these regions employed a nationalist ideology and that was over-determined by its socio-economic and political interests-which provide a validity

of Gellner's theory of Nationalism. Christophe Jaffrelot notes that Muslim nationalism 'did not derive from 'primordial' identity markers but was an ideological construction'. The Muslim intelligentsia employed identity markers through political organizations such as the Muslim League, to shape a nationalist Muslim identity. The 'manipulation of cultural symbols focused not only on Islam but also on Urdu'.... Muslim nationalism did not drive from, 'primordial, identity markers, but was an ideological constructions' (Jaffrelot, 2002, pp.10-11).

For Salman Rushdie (1983) and others, Pakistani nationhood was 'insufficiently imagined', given the ambiguities inherent in the demand for Pakistan. 'The insufficiency of the founding imagination has led to enduring pathologies and self-inflicted injuries in Pakistan' (Varshney 2008-09: 3). The two-nation theory provided the country with a '*nationalist* ideology – it has even been described as an 'ideological state' – which has been formulated against India, the 'other nation'. But it did not endow Pakistan with the sociological qualities of a nation' (Jaffrelot, 2002, p.8).

However, the nation that was supposed to embody this new identity remained rather elusive till the last moment, since the Muslim majority areas did not adhere to the idea of Pakistan till the mid-1940s. In 1946, they did so as a reaction to the rise to power of the Congress and that was 'a brief moment of political unity', to borrow the phrase of Yunas Samad (Samad, 1995, p. 90). In this context, Jaffrelot aptly remarks that since, 'the Muslim League had not fully taken roots in the region where Muslims were in a majority. The domination of the 'nationalist' over a nation that was still to be mobilized – or whose mobilization had to be sustained – became clear immediately after independence in 1947' (Jaffrelot, 2002, p.15).

The first and foremost 'strain' according to president Ayub Khan 'was ideological'. "Till the advent of Pakistan none of us was in fact a Pakistani, for the simple reason that there was no territorial entity bearing that name... prior to 1947 our

nationalism was based more on an idea than on any territorial definition... ideologically we were Muslim; territorially we happened to be Indian; and parochially we were conglomeration of at least eleven smaller, provincial loyalties” (Ayub Khan, 1960, p.549). Since its inception, Pakistan was confronted the ‘monumental task to spell out an identity’ (Ali, 2000). Crafting a Pakistani identity was considered a matter of national survival which meant that “Pakistan wove an intricate pattern of ideological differentiation with India” (Pande, 2018, p.16). After independence, religion-based identity and a national narrative about Pakistan's creation were constructed through educational curriculum and media propaganda. Since its emergence in 1947, Islam and anti-Indianism have been the two 'master narratives' of Pakistan's polity. Islam both as a cultural idea and as a religion failed to unite Pakistan's disparate communities. 'In the end', notes Varshney “anti-Indianism, albeit suffused with touch of ambivalence, has turned out to be a stronger uniting force” (Varshney, 2008-09, p. 6).

Civil-Military Imbalance

The first eleven years of independence were crucial for moulding and shaping Pakistan's political and administrative profile. However, state building in the precarious circumstances in the early years of the young nation entrenched the centre and the bureaucratic-military elite at the cost of political institutions and political processes. Pakistan came into being in extremely difficult conditions with serious domestic problems coupled with acute sense of insecurity vis-a-vis India. State survival became primary concern of the rulers of Pakistan who equated survival with powerful central government, strong defence posture, high defence allocations, and emphasis on monolithic nationalism. The imperatives of strong, coercive state apparatus were given priority over the need to create participatory political institution. “The army and bureaucracy have been the self-appointed guardians of the Pakistani state since independence. Political parties and constitution have come and gone or been

transformed, but these twin un-elected intuitions have remained the pillars” (Talbot, 2000, p.215).

Muhammad Waseem argues that the process of state-building in the new state has led to ascendancy of the non-parliamentary forces — first the migrants-dominated civil bureaucracy and later the army (Waseem, 2009, p.191). Partition and migration, to borrow Waseem's terminology, created a ‘Punjabi-Muhajir state, in as much as the commercial and professional elite drew heavily on these communities’ (Waseem, 2005, p.56). In the case of the ‘migratory elite’, in particular their lack of an electoral constituency in Pakistan made them natural allies of the bureaucracy in their own efforts towards postponement of elections *ad nauseum* (Waseem, 1989, p.97). All this hampered the path of development of participatory democratic tradition and federal shared rule in Pakistan. Migrants shaped the psyche of the new nation in terms of focusing on the feeling of insecurity vis-a-vis India, commitment to Islamic ideology and relative intolerance to sub-national identity.

At the time of its emergence Pakistani leaders were confronted with the problem of virtually a non-existent administrative structure, ethnic division, geographical incongruity of the eastern wing, shortage of funds, unresolved issue of national identity, and insecurity vis-a-vis India along with gigantic problems of refugee rehabilitation. The solution they came up with to deal with these challenges had three elements, namely, ‘bureaucratization, centralization and homogenization’ (World Press, 2008/09).

Although, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of the nation, was publically committed to a ‘constitutional social democracy’ and federalism, and believed that the best way to ensure the survival of the new state was through a unitary central government. In view of the urgent need to develop an effective administrative structure, and given the weak support base of the Muslim League in the new state, the ‘new leaders opted to continue their bureaucratic rule, and play down the political participation and

democratic processes. This laid the foundation for a weak democracy, which persists to this day' (Ali, 1983, p.42).

Hamza Alavi interprets the prevalence of the military in the state structure of Pakistan by constructing the 'Overdeveloped State' thesis. Alavi argues that Pakistan inherited a colonial state apparatus that were relatively overdeveloped in relation to society in which a Punjabi-dominated military-bureaucratic oligarchy dominated (Alavi, 1972, p.62). The institutional dominance of predominantly Punjabi civil-and military-bureaucracies within the state structure has curbed participatory politics and aggravated regional grievances. The representative government which may have provided a better functioning of federal democracy by providing better balance between the provinces and linguistic groups, has been kept under suspension (Kukreja, 2003, pp.13-14).

Colonial Legacy of the Vice-regal Tradition

For the political and administrative framework of the new state, Jinnah preferred to follow traditions and legacies handed down by the British Raj (Jalal, 1985) and arrogated more powers to him by assuming the office of the Governor-General (Sayeed, 1967, p.62). According to Satish Kumar, 'The dominant characteristic of the political culture that developed in Pakistan right from the beginning may be described as "Vice-regal"- a system in which power structure remained vertical and did not develop horizontally. It was thus inherently detrimental to the successful operation of a democratic federal polity' (Kumar, 1984, p.26). Jinnah, while being the Governor-General was also the Muslim League chief, and the president of the Constituent Assembly.

Jinnah's successors also used 'viceregalism' as a governing formula to consolidate state authority. 'Backed by the military', notes Aqil Shah (2016, pp.26-27), 'the viceregal executive sacked non-compliant civilian cabinets (1953), delayed constitution making, disbanded parliament when it crafted a federal democratic constitution (1954), removed an elected government in East-Pakistan (1954), and ultimately amalgamated the province

of West-Pakistan into 'One Unit' to create parity with East-Pakistan' (1955-1956).

Though both India and Pakistan inherited an identical colonial legacy and state apparatus at the time of independence, Philip Oldenburg maintains that in 1947 the balance of power favoured political leaders in India while it tilted towards the bureaucracy in Pakistan. What is referred to 'as the Punjab school of administration — epitomized by paternalistic colonial officers like John Lawrence — was central to Pakistan while it was peripheral in India. In addition, the Muslim League was a first-generation and relatively elitist party unlike the Indian National Congress which had over the years fashioned itself into a mass movement' (Oldenburg, 2010).

Under Jinnah's Governor-Generalship, control of the Muslim League cabinet and the political machinery was handed over to the governors and the bureaucrats. It was either Mudie or Cunningham who sent detailed reports about cabinet and party functions (Sayeed, 1967, p.63). The main tenor of their reports was that politicians were not allowing the government machinery to function with its pre-independence bureaucratic efficiency. A dying man, Jinnah could only think of short-term remedies. He decided to place the politicians under the bureaucratic tutelage (Sayeed, 1980, p.26). Consequently, 'Jinnah's charisma was tapped by the only well-organized and authoritative civil institution in the country, namely, the bureaucracy which enjoyed the former's patronage' (Waseem, 1994, p.338).

Hamza Alavi rightly observes: 'Jinnah's unintentional contribution to the future of Pakistan was a demotion of political leadership in favour of the bureaucracy' (Alavi, 1983, p.78). And it was the bureaucracy that had usually extended a willing hand to the military to intervene in Pakistani politics in 1958. This was in sharp contrast to India where Nehru, for all his considerable authority, was answerable to both the Congress party and the Parliament, and the bureaucracy and military were subordinate to civilian control of the elected leaders. The impact of bureaucratization

proved ominous for the democratization in Pakistan. The provincial government was subordinated to the center through the bureaucracy which rode roughshod over the politicians holding office.

The removal of governments in NWFP, Sindh and Punjab by federal government in the first two year of Pakistan's birth, marked the beginning of a process whereby provincial aspirations as well as constitutionalism were brushed aside by the autocratic federal government (Bansal, 2012, p.123).

Ascendancy of Civil-Military Oligarchy

In the post-Liaquat era Ghulam Muhammad's ascendancy marked the second phase in Pakistan's bureaucratic ascendancy, demonstrating the emerging power of bureaucrats who openly played a political role and manipulated politicians to suit their purpose (Kukreja, 1991, p.39). Soon, as Saeed Shafqat described it, the result was the 'conversion of the office of the Governor-General into an instrument of bureaucratic intervention' (Shafqat, 1997, p.26). Mass politics and Muslim League faded into oblivion and Pakistan by the early 50's was a captive of the bureaucratic-military arm of the state. A strong nexus also grew between the civil-bureaucracy and the military. Both were drawn and continued to be drawn from the same, mostly land-owning class and Punjabi ethnic group. It is not surprising, as Hamza Alavi observes, that in Pakistan's first two decades, 'the locus of power centred on the civil services rather than either the political leadership, whom it dominated, or the army with which it closely collaborated' (Alavi, 1983, p.72). Thus, the "ruling alliance, drawn mainly from the top echelons of the bureaucracy and army", adopted "a concerted strategy, to exploit and manipulate rivalries among the political leaders, which accentuated political fragmentation and ministerial crises" (Jalal, 1990, pp.295–296).

The civil-military oligarchy, supported socio-economically by feudal landlords, comprador bourgeoisie, and metropolitan capitalists, to use the phraseology of Hamza Alavi, never allowed democracy to flourish. The core leadership of the Muslim League

and civil-military bureaucracy came from predominantly the Punjabis and Muhajirs who had stakes in the central power. With a majority of the Bengali population, it was clear that an election on the basis of adult franchise would shift the power away from Punjabi-Muhajir elite to the Bengalis. The reluctance of the central leadership to introduce parliamentary democracy was directly linked with ethnic division of the country (Noman, 1988, p.9). By the use of ideological jargon, imposition of Urdu and schemes such as parity, One Unit, martial law or civilian rule, the powerful elite had denied heterogeneous communities any participation in the national affairs, or has simply manipulated plurality in order to perpetuate its own power. The culture of political intolerance and recourse to religion to impose unity could not forge national integration in the real sense of term. The colonial legacies of bureaucratic rule, centralism, government dismissal, assembly dissolution, the clash between regional identity and Muslim nationalism, and the system of ruling indirectly with the help of a collaborative network of local rural intermediaries, like landlords and tribal chiefs, lent Pakistan some very peculiar traits of elitist politics. Ayesha Jalal contends, "It was during the first decade of independence that an interplay of domestic, regional and international factors saw the civil-bureaucracy and the army gradually registering their dominance over parties and politicians within the evolving structure of the state" (Jalal, 1990, p.295).

Military: The Final Arbiter

The military is Pakistan's premier institution and is 'euphemistically referred to as 'the institution', or 'the establishment' to borrow Husain Haqqani's phrase (Haqqani, 2018, p. 161). The military started as the dominant institution in the new state and dominance it has perpetuated over the years. The institutional developments within the military had significant consequences for civilian politics because they reinforced the officer corps' emerging guardian in mentality. The partition of British India's assets in 1947 had left Pakistan with one-third of the British Indian army and only 17 per cent of its revenue sources

(Haqqani, 2018, p.161). Despite the lack of resources, the Pakistani armed forces enjoyed three massive political advantages over civilian organizations, as suggested by S.E. Finer, namely, a marked superiority in organization, a highly emotionalized symbolic status, and a monopoly of arms.

The Pakistani political elites conception of acute insecurity vis-à-vis India, including Kashmir conflict and irredentist Afghan claim on Pakistan's northwest territories spurred militarization of the Pakistani state in the earlier years and facilitated the expansion of army's role. It has been argued that Pakistan's pursuit of parity in defence capabilities propelled the army in a commanding position in the corridors of power. The obsession to attain parity with India has helped to boost the military expenditure at the cost of the developmental projects. 'As state-building and survival became synonymous with the 'war effort', the civilian leadership diverted scarce resources from development to defence and abdicated its responsibility to oversight over the military, thereby allowing the generals a virtual free hand over internal organizational affairs and national security management' (Shah, 2016, p.25).

The pre-eminence of the security narrative made it difficult for Pakistan to debate fundamental policy choices. In this context, Husain Haqqani argues, 'Most nations raise an army proportionate to the size of threat to their security. In Pakistan's case, the magnitude of security threats has been expanded to match the size of the army inherited from the colonial era (Haqqani, 2018, p.161). The US military and economic aid in 1950-60s (and Pakistan's participation in Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the 1980s and in the new millennium, enhanced Pakistan's capabilities qualitatively as well as quantitatively and contributed towards fanning the army's praetorian appetite.

Shuja Nawaz in his authoritative study notes that 'Pakistan's history is one of conflict between an underdeveloped political system and a well-organized army'. Nawaz further contends that 'the army grew in numbers and political strength as counter

weight to a hostile India, next door and in relation to the democratic political system' (Nawaz, 2008, p.28). Eventually, the army emerged as the power broker and moved to take complete control which was eventually consummated through a formal/direct takeover in 1958. During 1947-58 in a formal, constitutional sense, Pakistan's history has been marked by political instability. In a non-legal, non-constitutional sense it reveals a steady institutional development of the civilian and military bureaucracies. Slowly and gradually political power slipped from political parties into the hands of the civil services and the army (Kukreja, 1985, p.57). In this context Nawaz aptly remarks, 'The paradox that hobbled Pakistan's political development was that as the army grew in strength and size, it stunted the growth of the political system whose leaders either made no attempt to redress the power imbalance between the institutions of the state and that of the army, making the latter effectively the centre of power, or worse they invited the army to settle political differences among themselves' (Nawaz, 2008, p.28).

Both, Shuja Nawaz and Ayesha Siddiqi in their seminal works posit that the army has intervened only with the active support of civilian institution which are subsequently further retarded with every military takeover. The army has never come to power on its own. Rather, it has always come to power with the assistance of the civil bureaucracies and politicians. In fact, Pakistan's political leadership and the civilian bureaucracy aid and abet the erosion of democracy and entrenchment of military dominance. As Siddiqi poignantly notes that the army derives its potency from the civilians. The acceptance of the military as a political arbiter, compounded with its prominent role as the guardian of the country's security, sovereignty, and ideology (Siddiqi, 2007, p.58).

Nawaz notes that Pakistan has emerged as 'a persistent praetorian state with military or quasi-military rule for most of its life after independence from the British, wherein the army maintain patron client relationship with the bureaucracy and with Islamist parties whom it used in its efforts to fight populist leaders

in both east and west Pakistan and fuel the Kashmir insurgency against the Indian rule' (Nawaz, 2008, pp.29-30).

In Pakistan, the army is the final arbiter in the affairs of the state. It dictates politics, foreign policy and now increasingly has deep and entrenched interest in the economy. The army has penetrated the state apparatus and economy to such a degree that neither the political class nor any social class can have any meaningful share in power without its will (Siddiqi, 2007). In fact, 'the military has become incorporated and woven into the fabric of state, society, economy, and structure of Pakistan as the most dominant of all forms of the country's institutions, and increasingly, the possibility of Pakistan without the pervasive and intrusive role of the military, seems, mere wrongful thinking' (Zaidi, 2005, p. 5174). Over the years military has deeply entrenched its prerogatives over its internal structure and its function which limits the scope for the establishment of civilian supremacy over the armed forces. The military regimes of Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq, respectively, included their personnel in government and semi-government jobs and professions.

The corporate muscle of the military over the years has also grown steadily, making it financially autonomous and self-reliant. The military today is the largest and richest corporate house and land owner in Pakistan, which includes source of industries, trading houses, banking, leasing, and insurance companies, transport corporations and real and housing estates. Five foundations, namely, Fauzi Foundation, the Army Welfare Trust, Shaheen foundation and Bahria Foundation are controlled by the military and are considered as the largest business group in Pakistan. The financial and the political autonomy of the military deepen its interest in retaining control of the country. Talat Masood labels it as 'institutionalized corruption' (Misra, 2011, p.11).

Revival of Democracy in the Post-Musharraf Era (2008 Onwards)

The developments in the Pakistani state suggest that the unelected but a well-entrenched military-bureaucratic

establishment, the bedrock of the Pakistani state structure, constitutes a thinly-based edifice. These monopolistic power elite has too often opposed measures such as democratization, decentralization, accountability, land reforms, freedom of media and the independence of judiciary (Malik, 1997). The post-Musharraf revival of democracy in Pakistan is depicted as a 'new' beginning or 'significant' transition towards democratic institutionalization. However, the institutionalization of democratic governance has not taken place. There is little evidence to suggest that balance of civil-military relations has shifted in the favour of civilian rulers. Despite democratic transition, military continues to retain its core institutional privileges, in terms of control over its internal structure, national security, and budgetary allocations. Military remains strong enough to maintain its political and strategic influence in the governance. Overall, the military has continued to retain its core institutional prerogative in terms of budgetary allocation, the management of national security policy, and the conduct of foreign policy. 'At the same time', Aqil Shah remarks, 'it has successfully resisted periodic civilian challenges to its core institutional prerogative through both active and passive non-compliance, thereby undermining authority of elected government led by the PPP and on occasions threatening its survival....The military's relationship with the current PML-N government too has been fraught with tensions over Sharif's decision to prosecute Musharraf as well as his attempts to seek peace with India' (Shah, 2014, p.51). Under Nawaz Sharif, the army initiated a new offensive approach to roll back the democratic space by expanding its monopoly to key internal security issues through 21st Amendment which gives the military a legal basis to intervene in the internal matters (Samad, 2017, p.518). The armed forces aversion to civilian control is enabled by their considerable autonomy from civilian oversight. Military's continuous exercise of undemocratic prerogatives entails the authority of the democratic governments and erodes the

prospects of the institutional consolidation of democracy in Pakistan (Shah, 2014, p.52).

The PPP's civilian government of President Asif Ali Zardari (2008-2013) and PML government headed by Nawaz Sharif and later Shahid Khaqan Abbasi (2013-2018) have 'typically operated in the military's lurking shadow' (Shah, 2011, p.71). Pakistan's status today, to borrow T.V. Paul's phrase, Pakistan is a 'rare garrison cum-hybrid democratic state' (Paul, 2014, p.79). He further notes: Pakistan ended up as a garrison praetorian state and whenever the military ceded power to elected civilian governments, it did so only partially. This left Pakistan a hybrid democratic model where the ultimate power rested not with the people but with the military as a veto player in any decision of that civilian government would take (Paul, 2014, p.74).

Conclusion

Seventy three years of tumultuous political history and the ongoing crisis of governability in Pakistan, which has experienced and a patron of long periods of military rule interspersed within the country's power structure. The absence of consensual politics, enduring constitutionalism and a properly agreed – upon mechanism for electoral transfer of power is reflected in the country's periodic phases of instability. Such intermittent crises, multiplied by an uneasy ethno-regional polarization, the rising clout of religious fundamentalism and Jihadism, recurring economic crises coupled with the heroin-kalakshnikov culture, have raised questions about Pakistan's survival as a state and have often allowed analysts to view Pakistan as either a 'failed' or a 'failing' state (Malik, 2002, p.205).

The present (post-Musharraf) democratic experiment in Pakistan can be labelled as 'puppet democracy' functioning under the shadow of military veto. Democracy as a political system which permits sustained and full participation of people, independence of judiciary, free press, rule of law as yet to strike roots in Pakistan. The task of civilian institution-building can be

undertaken only through a strong national, grassroots, mass-based political party led by a skilful political leadership.

In sum, Pakistan's traumatic political history justify the description of Pakistan being 'insufficiently imagined', to borrow the phrase from Salman Rushdie. However, imagination is by definition is not a finite process. 'To end its march of folly', Hussain Haqqani calls for a reimagining and reconceptualization of Pakistan. To reimagining Pakistan as an inclusive, pluralist, multi-ethnic democratic modern Muslim state needs to abandon the narrow ideological paradigm of Pakistani Nationalism, hostility with India, Punjabi-dominated establishment, and rental political economy (Haqqani, 2018).

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Book Reviews

Jaishankar, S. (2020). *The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World*. New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India, 240 pages.

The book is a blend of theoretical concepts and contemporary reality in the field of International Relations. It emphasizes on importance of International Relations as an autonomous subject and not as a subset of domestic politics. The beauty of the book lies in its titles of chapters where problems and solutions are given in 3 words each. It is enriched with professional experiences of author in the International Relations as a diplomat. It provides a detailed history of International Relations events at global and regional level post India's independence. It further links those events with changing Indian foreign policy. It's temporal range is as broad as India's ancient history to post-colonial turbulences to current COVID-19 challenge. It's unit of analysis is how domestic polity of India has shaped it's foreign policy, it's role in global events and vice versa. It amalgamates India's past with India's present to pave a way for India's future foreign policy. The book is wide in its approach to have inculcated political, economic, technological, environmental dimension in International Relations and India's foreign policy. The book is divided into 8 chapters discussing major burdens of past in India's foreign policy, a new emerging plurilateral picture of world politics, relocating statecraft in Indian tradition, analysing relations with important stakeholders like USA, EU, China, Japan, ASEAN at regional and global level, nationalism etc in individual chapters.

Problematizing existing foreign policy along with prescribing changes for future foreign policy is the writing style of the author. It is in this line Mr. Jaishankar emphasizes on strategic autonomy where India defines itself rather than the world defining India. He prescribes global relevance and realism for India's foreign policy. The point of contest to put forward is - India was always globally relevant since its independence like NAM and has glimpses of realism like demanding US assistance in 1962 war with China,

Russia's assistance in 1971 war with Pakistan. Though, these points are present in the book, but are not adequately emphasized. The book sounds confusing over using historical method to find loopholes in past, descriptive method for present and prescriptive method for future. The important concepts of IR like balance of power, multipolarity, plurilateralism, collective security is used vaguely as suited to context without any intellectual investigation.

The author divides post-independent India's foreign policy in 6 phases ranging from an era of optimistic non-alignment (1946-1962) to a decade of realism and recovery (1962-1971) to greater Indian regional assertion (1971-1991) to dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of a 'unipolar' world to India reaching out to US to fifth phase to India acting as balancing power in sixth phase of post 2014 with an energetic diplomacy. The ingenuity of relocating statecraft from western window to India's tradition and citing learnings of Mahabharat and Bhagavad-Gita era in modern era like strategic deception over strategic restraint, power, realpolitik over ethics are the most innovative reflection of Indian foreign policy. Dealing with individual important stakeholders in India's foreign policy- the conundrum associated with China is presented well. Yet, the book did not bring in any new insights or prescribe any sustainable solution except strategic maturity in dealing with the Dragon. The authors follow a hard-line realism led approach for Pakistan but refrain to suggest same for China. He demands urging behaviour on behalf of Japan for economic collaboration with India. His approach lacks detailed regional level analysis where India faces complacent relationship with Russia, increasing China and Pakistan's hostility, proxy wars in Afghanistan, RCEP exit etc.

The book is lucid and informative but lacks connectivity between paragraphs within a chapter. Also, in the given process it is sounding confusing at times; for example-stressing on hard power but prescribing solutions of soft power like brand building for global relevance by assisting in disaster management in neighbourhood. In its journey for a comprehensive coverage, the

book loses the linkages and misses clear stand required for better understanding. Another major shortcoming is uncritical evaluation of current foreign policy and presenting it as a mechanism to correct past mistakes while not admitting clearly it as mistakes but calling them as burden for example- delayed economic reforms, prolonged exercise of nuclear option. Despite these shortcomings, the book is one of the most elaborative work on Indian foreign policy with a new insight of close corroboration of global events and national politics. The epilogue in the final segment of the book delineates a space for India in changing International Relations during COVID-19 pandemic through self-reliance. The author desires to fill up the loopholes of foreign policy with a realistic and deterministic national polity, atmanirbhar economy and making Indian virtues like Namaste global.

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David Brewster, (Ed.) (2018). *India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval Dominance in the Indian Ocean*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 278.

China does not have a coastline on the Indian Ocean but the Indian Ocean has never been out of China's strategic thought. With China expanding its military footprints deep into the Indian Ocean territory has led to a game of power projections in the region and beyond. In response, the Indian Navy is reorienting its naval doctrine to counter such aggressive posturing in the region. By employing a plan for sustained presence in and around the wider Indian Ocean region both the Asian powers are showing their resolve to counter the naval dominance of each other in the region. With the emergence of India and China as world's major economic power their military and maritime capabilities have seen a quantum jump bringing about a major shift in regional balance of power. Their growth in economy and power has resulted in competitive interest articulation by these two powers in the region. China's growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean is seen by strategists as a challenge to India's regional leadership and global power aspirations. Thus how India and China co-exist in this maritime space will decide the fate of the region and beyond. It is in this backdrop that this well researched volume edited by David Brewster containing essays by noted strategic analysts from across the globe have tried to bring forth the Chinese and Indian perspective about the naval strategies and counter-strategies that plays out in the Indian Ocean.

The book is an essential resource to study, analyse, explain, and disseminate all relevant information and developments related to competitive power games between the naval forces of India and China in the Indian Ocean Region. It explores the Sino-Indian engagement in the Indian Ocean maritime domain and in doing so addresses several underlying themes. Chapter 1-4 examines the ideational and perception issues of the two neighbours about their legitimate security roles in the Indian Ocean. This section explores the perception that drives these two nations' strategic behaviours against each other. Chapter 5-10 forms the second

theme of the book that deals with the strategic dimension of the naval forces of India and China in the Indian Ocean. It lists out the various aspects like maritime domain awareness, naval doctrines, comparison of naval power and capabilities, and maritime interests of India and China in the region. Further Chapter 11-13 focuses on economic dimensions of the Chinese presence in the region especially through its Maritime Silk Route strategy and its implications on the regional stability. It also looks into the response India and other nations devise in order to engage or counter China in wake of overlapping interests the region hold for every actor present in the Indian Ocean.

In the first chapter, David Brewster examines the aspects and dimensions of India and China as major powers and their respective roles in the Indian Ocean region. The Chapter views India as a resident power in the Indian Ocean, thus the presence of any extra-regional actor in the region as a challenge. Beijing, on the other hand, does not agree with the Indian perception and thus is trying to expand its sphere of influence in the region. Therefore, this contrasting perception about each other is leading to heightened tensions and increasing the naval competition between the two neighbours. In Chapter 2, 'Managing Maritime Competition between India and China' by Jingdong Yuan scans the China's expanding maritime presence in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) and also looks at the responses of India to such strategic posturing. He further argues that China should have a pragmatic view of India as a resident power in the region and thus make concrete efforts to ensure that these two emerging powers can manage their interests without bumping into one-another. Pramit Pal Chaudhuri in Chapter 3, 'The China Factor in Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi and Singh Governments', examines the different approaches of foreign policy makers under both Manmohan Singh's government and Narendra Modi's government. He considers China as an 'autistic power' whose terms of engagement has failed in the region. In Chapter 4, 'Limitations on China's Ability to Understand Indian Apprehensions about China's Rise as a Naval Power', leading

American expert on Sino-Indian relations, John Garver, focuses on “China’s strategic blind spots in understanding the world around it.” Chinese Professor You Ji, asserts in Chapter 5, ‘The Indian Ocean: A Grand Sino-Indian Game of ‘Go’ that China’s maritime strategy is about securing its interests especially around the critical sea lane of communications (SLOCs) around the Indian Ocean. Prof. You argues that China’s ‘frontier defence’ strategy is aimed at making China a two-ocean force and expand its navy’s combat reach in the Indian Ocean by acquiring blue water capabilities. Prof. You further goes on to reject the narrative that goes around building Indian Ocean as India’s Ocean. Professor Srikanth Kondapalli, one of India’s leading academic analysts on the PLA, examines in Chapter 6, ‘China’s Evolving Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean: An Indian Perspective’, the various dimension Chinese security presence in the IOR. He points out the “flag follows the trade” approach of Chinese strategist as a precursor to present policy of dominating the IOR maritime zone by expanding its sea power capabilities. Chinese aggressive posturing in the region is being seen as a threat to regional stability and thus India, USA, Japan and others are coming together to counter China in the region. In Chapter 7, ‘Scenarios for China’s Naval Deployment in the Indian Ocean and India’s Naval Response’, Raja Menon, gives us an insider view of a naval practitioner on the vulnerabilities that China faces in IOR. He argues that China is at a disadvantageous position in IOR due to the harsh geographical settings and thus giving India a strategic edge in terms of geography in the Indian Ocean thereby making Chinese technological advancement and naval power redundant. In Chapter 8, ‘The Subsurface Dimension of Sino-Indian Maritime Rivalry’, Iskander Rehman examines the capabilities and the nature of engagement Indian and Chinese navy has in the IOR. Chapter 9, ‘India’s Evolving Maritime Domain Awareness Strategy in the Indian Ocean’, by Darshana M. Baruah focuses on the maritime domain awareness as a key driver in maritime engagement in the region. Noted maritime expert, Abhijit Singh in Chapter 10, ‘India’s Naval Interests in the Pacific’, argues on

similar lines and calls out Chinese expansionist approach in the IOR by stationing naval platform in absence of any credible military threat around the SLOCs as an escalatory tactics to flare up threat perceptions in the region. Further in Chapter 11, 'The Maritime Silk Route and India: The Challenge of Overcoming Cognitive Divergence', Professor Zhu Li, calls India 'oversensitive' on China's economic outreach programs and policies like MSR and Belt and Road initiatives by looking at it from a security point of view rather than in economic terms. In Chapter 12, 'China's Evolving Strategy in the Indian Ocean Region: Risks in China's MSR Initiatives', Jabin T. Jacob, gives us a different perspective on MSR and other such initiatives. His pragmatic analysis brings out the political ramification of these initiatives on Chinese domestic politics. Australian Rory Medcalf, in Chapter 13, 'India and China: Terms of Engagement in the Western Indo-Pacific', examines the factors that are leading to expansion of Chinese naval footprint in the region and what is the strategic response of India to such aggressive power projection in its backyard.

These Chapters in this volume provide to be a valuable resource to study, analyse, and understand the Sino-Indian rivalry in the Indo-Pacific region. The book maps up the security dynamics of the Indian Ocean region and provides for a balance view from different perspectives. Thus this book readily fills in the gap left out in the Indian ocean maritime security studies and is a must read for every enthusiast interested in Indo-Pacific geopolitics.

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Sinha, S. (2020). *The years that changed India: Vajpayee*. India: Penguin Random House, pp. 357.

The book written by one of Vajpayee's close associates, who worked initially as secretary to the leader of the opposition (1996-97) and later private secretary during his Prime Ministership (1998-1999). The book unfolds multifaceted persona of Vajpayee as an ardent patriot, a poet turned Statesman, Prime Minister and above all a good human being. The book transmits immense contribution in the field of Indian politics and governance. It is a piece of literature conceived and executed by one who was in the immediate vicinity of the Prime Minister, and hence the author includes multiple vantage points and incorporates various experiences. This book can therefore be categorized as a semi-biographical work.

With penetrating into Vajpayee's era, the unconscious artist in the author instinctively displays his literary excellence delving into various dimensions of the 1990s decade. The book is divided into 10 chapters which rationalizes the theme based content. The narrative focuses on the decades of Vajpayee's political and intellectual journey that starts as being External Affairs Minister in the short lived Janata government to heading the government as the Prime Minister. The coalition government headed by Vajpayee made a remarkable footprint in the political history of India.

The book portrays Vajpayee as larger than life figure which in a way meant a seasoned Politician above Politics, having excellent oratory skills personified with unaltered generosity. He was the star of Indian politics during the 1990's as no other political leader could match his proficiency in governance and politics. He worked very hard for his speeches and in remembering the contents of parliamentary debates. Vajpayee's favorite subject throughout his life remained foreign policy. After Nehru, he was one of the most significant leaders who helped in shaping the foreign priorities and policies. Vajpayee's approach was larger than that of the party's and his popularity was far greater than

that of the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) with leaders from opposition parties having great admiration for him. Even though critics often commented that Vajpayee was 'right man in the wrong party', he dismissed all such thoughts (p. 9).

In the words of the author, "Vajpayee always believed that the fruit was a product of, and drew its qualities from the tree" (p. 326).

According to the author with BJP's march to power, Vajpayee emerged as the shadow of the party changing the contours of Indian party system. In 1994, he was elected as the leader of opposition. Throughout this period Vajpayee stood shoulder to shoulder with the government. In 1996 Vajpayee became the party's Prime Ministerial candidate, thereby making a serious bid for power. The book unfolds the formation of Vajpayee's government. Vajpayee was full of enthusiasm and has achieved so much in politics without any godfather. He was a keen observer and has always worked for the country's national interest and urged the parliament to come together on security issues. Thus he proclaimed that on national security issues there can be no politics.

The 1998 government under Vajpayee's leadership, the BJP's performance was exceptional. However, he had to maintain balance throughout his tenure managing the various strands of NDA (National Democratic Alliance). The allies of the BJP created problems throughout the tenure of Vajpayee as the regional allies were continuously demanding considerable concessions or else they blackmailed him to withdraw the support that would lead to the fall of the government. Through the years of his Prime Ministership he rarely got support of the allies. As author quotes Jaswant Sinha, "Vajpayee's most of the energies were consumed by 'coalition compulsions'" (p. 148). The regional allies - AIADMK, Samata party, TDP used blackmail tactics which paralyzed the functioning of the parliament and the Vajpayee government. However, the writer saw the failure of BJP in managing the

regional parties than that of Vajpayee. Consequently, the strength of Vajpayee increased in an incremental manner over the years within the ruling coalition. Vajpayee followed the policy of “coalition dharma” in striking the balance between different political parties (p. 175).

Under the leadership of Vajpayee, the NDA formulated National Agenda for Governance (NAG) which was considered the common programme for the allies of NDA (p. 60). The BJP was trying for electoral reforms. Vajpayee was in favor of Lok Pal that would even cover the office of Prime Minister, ensuring 1/3rd reservation for women in state legislatures and parliament, legislations on Uniform Civil Code (UCC), the abrogation of article 370 and the construction of Ram Mandir in Ayodhya. He also stressed the need for having a national security council to analyze military, economic and political threats to the country. The NDA government was unable to make headway on majority of these issues due to lack of political consensus. Vajpayee was a man of political ideocracy and ethics. His far sighted approach in politics made him a distinctive personality and staged his level above the routine politicians. Contrary to the popular impression, “Vajpayee was an iron hand in a velvet glove” (p. 17). He was committed to abolishing hunger, doubling women’s literacy rates and participation and delegating powers to the states. Apart from his views on governance and in bringing out the potential of public his government was also committed to secularism and upholding the constitutional ideals.

The narrative highlights the most commendable efforts of the Vajpayee government with regard to India’s self-enlightenment and security interests. Vajpayee was an old advocate of the nuclear option, which is why he welcomed the 1974 tests, refused to sign CTBT and unfailingly paving the way for credible nuclear deterrence thereby making India a nuclear state. He highlighted that there was a price to be paid for becoming a nuclear state, and the country must be ready to pay it. As a measure of retaliation the western countries imposed sanctions upon India.

However, Vajpayee was assertive and confident in the matters of national security.

While mentioning India's relationship with its neighbors the author argues that Vajpayee was a strong votary in enhancing India's relations worldwide and was prepared to go 'extra mile' to improve relations with Pakistan. Vajpayee conceded that border disputes with china and Pakistan and the Chinese nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan had resulted in India facing two nuclear armed neighbors. The Sino – Pak cooperation has allowed Pakistan to use jihad as the instrument of extremist terrorism to destabilize its neighbors (p. 105). Vajpayee stressed on the need of a focused leadership which attends to the security needs. Thus the decision to conduct the nuclear tests was in the national interest. The writer acclaims that "Vajpayee was far more a person of steel than was apparent" indicating towards his committed nature.

The Vajpayee government maintained its domestic and international priorities while diffusing the tensions. U.K., France and Russia were the supporters of India being a responsible power and backed the nuclear tests. Even Dalai Lama sent a personal letter to Vajpayee supporting the decision to conduct the test by alluding that the possession of nuclear arms would deter any offensive actions and therefore ensure peace (p. 106). In this regard, Vajpayee clarified that India's interests were deterrence and not using the weapons as instruments of offense.

During the Vajpayee years the BJP-RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) relationship was a complex one. Though he publicly mentioned that RSS was his soul but there were some hidden strains in the RSS and Vajpayee's terms on some issues pertaining to Ram Mandir and his economic policies. Vajpayee is often considered as a holder of liberal view of economy, in this sense the swadeshi segment of the RSS was uncomfortable with his economic ideas. When in 1999 the Vajpayee government was defeated by one vote in the no confidence motion, Dattopant

Thengadi, a senior RSS leader criticized Vajpayee as a 'petty politician' playing into the hands of his 'policy advisors with doubtful credentials' (p. 264).

In 1999, India faced serious external challenges. Vajpayee expressed his concerns on the China - Pakistan nexus. After losing in no confidence motion, he acted as the caretaker Prime Minister. As the author says this gesture of Vajpayee was highly commendable as despite many national political problems and not being the formal head of the government, he defended his country militarily as a statesman. The Kargil war and its tactful management by the team of Vajpayee acclaimed India's image on the international scene as the responsible power.

On the question of Kashmir - Vajpayee publicly stated that India was ready to talk to Pakistan on all issues, including Kashmir. This dangerous move of Pakistan went in India's favor in a major way as Pakistan was criticized by the international governments whereas India was trying to peacefully de-escalate the situation. However the international situation became normal during the Kargil War. The western political class criticized Pakistan for its act of cross border terrorism and infiltration of Jihadi terrorism.

In an attempt to reframe international orders, Vajpayee initiated a bus service from Delhi to Lahore in a bid to build peaceful and cooperative relationship with Pakistan. From his historic speech at Minar-e-Pakistan he assured the people of both countries for the desire for lasting peace and friendship. From the understanding of the author, Vajpayee's bus ride to Lahore was part of Confidence building measures between the two countries (p.228).

The account elaborately discusses about the political turmoil faced by the Vajpayee government. Though the period of Vajpayee's Prime Ministership seemed to be short, but it was full with obstacles ranging from domestic political issues with the allies to the nuclear question and the Kargil war. The road was not easy for Vajpayee as government inherited a weak economy and it was enveloped by the political upheavals. Through this period, he carried too much burden

on his shoulders worked hard in every aspect be it industry, ensuring minority rights, infrastructure building, managing illegal infiltration, structural economic reforms, national security and the most important foreign affairs. The major incidents such as Pokhran tests, Kargil war, the bus ride from Delhi to Lahore, the political instability due to unsupportive tendency of allies, Vajpayee's foreign visits and his speeches has been extensively covered in the book. The author himself witnessed these occurrences which makes his narrative a firsthand experience for the readers. The book offers deep insights into Vajpayee's leadership during India's most difficult yet transformative years. Therefore, the author aptly justifies the title of the book – the years that changed India: Vajpayee.

Looking at the entire canvas, the author has successfully captured the life of Vajpayee from bird's eye view. An in-depth reading of the whole account shows how essentially the themes are being connected. The use of multiple sources makes the book a great literary work and gives many primary insights into the political years of Vajpayee's journey. The book provides an extensive account on the political and administrative voyage of the former Prime Minister Vajpayee. The book showcased that Vajpayee has a distinctive character of carrying all the political opinions together. However despite the belief that personal is political, the author has chosen not to uncover the personal aspects of Vajpayee's life of that period, which if done, could have added new dimensions to the understanding of the text. Nonetheless the book showcased the successful tenure of the Vajpayee's government, his decisive governance and far sightedness paving the way for Shining India and unprecedented rise of India in the global world.

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